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1Making Sense of the Disagreements about the Nature of Law: The Puzzles of Legal Normativity and 
Human Autonomy
The thesis attempts to make sense of the disagreements in legal philosophy about the relationship 
between legal norms and requirements of morality. In particular, it asks why positivists and non-
positivists explain in opposing ways the moral requirements, if any, of legally valid norms. In the first 
part of the thesis I defend the idea of the rule of law, or legal normativity, as being based on an
inherently moral phenomenon: substantive equality of those subject to legal power. I defend the 
idea that respect for this moral phenomenon inherent in the rule of law leads to compliance with 
principles of substantive justice which are inherently moral. I then show how failure to adhere to the
requirements of legal normativity has led, in the British control orders saga, to failures of substantive 
justice.
In the second part of the thesis I explore in further detail the moral characteristic specific to legal 
normativity. I argue that legal norms necessarily possess binding force, or normative force, for those 
that are subject to legal power. I then seek to ascertain the source and extent of the normative force 
of law. I identify it in the moral idea of respect for human autonomy understood as the defining 
human ability to act for reasons. A legal community, I argue, can only exist in a community of 
autonomous beings. This explains and justifies, among other things, why the law acts through 
legitimate authority. It also explains the limits of the moral fallibility of law: the law can fail morally 
in several ways but it cannot fail to respect the idea of human autonomy. This explains the source of 
the disagreements in legal philosophy. Legal validity and moral requirements are inseparably 
related, but only in specific ways. It is the idea of human autonomy which links law to certain moral 
requirements.
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5INTRODUCTION
1. Disagreements in Law
Legal practice is fuelled by disagreements. This appears as a truism to most lawyers. Disagreements 
give rise to legal disputes; they occur during the resolution of disputes and carry on after disputes 
have been authoritatively settled in the form of contrasting criticisms of the outcomes. Individuals 
and corporations resort to the law with the hope of settling disagreements amongst themselves. Yet, 
when they speak to their lawyers they are confronted with another set of disagreements: 
disagreements about what the law says. The contracts they drafted with the intent of avoiding 
disputes can be interpreted in various and contrasting ways; the appropriate length of custodial 
sentences vary according to differing opinions of counsel and judges; what the constitution requires 
in a particular case is the subject of intense debate.   
The aim of this thesis is not necessarily to understand the pervasive nature of disagreements in legal 
practice or to illustrate how lawyers settle disputes about what the law says. It is directed at a more 
abstract but nonetheless contentious issue about law. My aim is to understand the possibility of 
theoretical disagreements about the nature of law. Long before John Austin proclaimed that “the 
existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another “,
1
positivists and non-positivists had
been disagreeing with each other and amongst themselves about the correct answer to the question 
“what is law?”. The crux of the disagreement seems to lie in the separation thesis, endorsed by 
positivists and denied by non-positivists, which claims in its most abstract form that law and morality 
are not necessarily connected. The generality of this thesis has itself been the source of much 
disagreement and confusion.
2
Thus, for the scope of this thesis it needs to be specified. 
The confusion related to the general form of the separation thesis can be explained by making 
reference to at least two different sources. The first relates to what sort of connections between law 
and morality the positivist and non-positivist traditions are interested in denying or endorsing. The 
second concerns the different linguistic senses of “law” and “morality”. I will proceed with the 
second before tackling the first. 
                                                          
1
J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (W.E. Rumble ed., Cambridge University Press 1995).
2
See for example the essay “The Argument from Justice” in J. Raz, The Authority of Law (2nd edn., OUP 2009) 
where Raz criticises the separation thesis as presented by Robert Alexy in R. Alexy, The Argument from Injustice
(B. Litchewski Paulson and S. L. Paulson trs., 1st edn., Clarendon Press 2002).
6Consider the following extracts: a) “Law is the union of primary and secondary rules”
3
; b) 
“Jurisprudence is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law”
4
; c) “[Hart] 
does not believe that the purpose of law is to provide a justification for state coercion”.
5
It might be 
clear that the different linguistic senses in which the different authors are using the word “law” here 
do not coincide. In a) “law” is used as a synonymous with “legal system”, in b) it is used to indicate 
something similar to a “judicial decision” while in c) it is used to signify “legal theory”. These 
linguistic senses of “law” can be evidenced from the differing contexts in which they are used and 
vary accordingly within the same author. It is not surprising then that the variable linguistic meaning 
of “law” can sometimes create confusion in understanding what the disagreement on the separation 
thesis is about. Indeed a case can be made that debates about the nature of law have gradually 
shifted in emphasis from the relationship between legal systems and morality to a necessary 
connection between morality and adjudication and, more recently, to a necessary connection 
between theorising about the law and evaluative judgements (including moral judgements). 
Needless to say, the quality of the relationship between these different linguistic senses of “law” and 
morality are not identical.
In this thesis I will assume that the separation thesis is, unless when a contrary intention is 
expressed, concerned with “law” in its linguistic sense of “legal norm”. A norm expresses what acts 
ought to be performed in a given scenario. This proposition is necessarily left in a very general form 
in order to avoid a bias towards a positivist or non-positivist conception of legal normativity.
6
However, I think it is safe to state that both parties agree that jurisprudence is primarily concerned 
with the study of legal norms. It is by understanding the central features of legal norms that we can 
then properly make reference to related concepts such as legal systems, judicial decisions, rule of 
law and so forth. Positivists and not positivists disagree precisely on the conditions for having legally 
valid norms. In particular, the dispute rests on the correct relationship between morality and legal 
norms.
While I have clarified that there are several linguistic senses of “law” and that the separation thesis 
needs to be read as primarily focusing on the relationship between morality and legal norms, I have 
not yet attempted to clarify the different linguistic senses of “morality”. It was Fuller who 
denounced the fact that “Definitions of law we have, in almost unwanted abundance. But when law 
                                                          
3
H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn., OUP 1994) Chapter V.
4
R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing 2004) 90.
5
J. Dickson, ‘Methodology in Jurisprudence: A Critical Survey’ [2004] Legal Theory 117, 141.
6
Notice that I refer to norms instead of rules in order to overcome the distinction Dworkin made as a challenge 
to Hart that judges make use of legal rules and principles. See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (corrected 
edn., Duckworth 1978) essays 2 and 3. I believe that both rules and principles can in fact be referred to as 
norms without conceptual contradiction. 
7is compared with morality, it seems to be assumed that everyone knows what the second term of 
the comparison embraces.”
7
  Indeed, it is extremely doubtful that there is a general consensus 
between theorists, inside and outside the discipline of jurisprudence and legal philosophy, of what 
the notion of morality is. Certainly, morality has something to do with what categorically ought or 
ought not to be done. Again, this is admittedly too general. However, just as similarly with “law”, in 
the context of the separation thesis, legal philosophers use “morality” to refer to all kinds of 






Even more curiously, “morality” has 
often been used by various legal philosophers in opposition to “wickedness” or “iniquity” instead of 
“immorality” or “amorality”.
11
“Wickedness” here usually refers to violations of the most basic 
standards of human rights as expressed in various international documents.
12
  
How is one then to choose in what linguistic sense of “morality” the separation thesis ought to be 
framed? I will spend much time in defending an ethical system based on the concept of autonomy. 
However, I will not engage in the exploration of this ethical system until part 2 of this thesis. Instead, 
in part 1 I will assume that morality comprises the familiar institution of human rights as expressed 
in several documents. The justification of this assumption will be cleared in part 2.      
Given the above, what sorts of connections between legal norms and morality are legal philosophers 
disagreeing about? Speaking on behalf of all positivists, John Gardner has declared that all positivists 
must subscribe to the following: “In any legal system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and 
hence whether it forms part of the law of that system, depends on its sources, not its merits (where 
its merits, in the relevant sense, include the merits of its sources).”
13
Two points are to be noted. The 
first is that there is no mention of morality in Gardner’s formulation. Rather, like in Austin’s 
formulation of the separation thesis, “merits” is used. This formulation of the separation thesis 
appears to be wider than it needs to be. “Merits” here cannot be taken as a linguistic variant to 
“morality”. Indeed, as Leslie Green has argued, it means “any evaluative considerations that would 
argue in favour of making or sustaining a possible legal rule”,
14
including economic, sociological or 
political merits. In this thesis, I will confine myself to moral merits only as this is the main focus of 
non-positivism. 
                                                          
7
L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (Revised edn., Yale University Press 1969) 3-4.
8
See for example the Radbruch formula, i.e. extreme injustice is not law, as in G. Radbruch (B. Paulson and S. 
Paulson trs.), ‘Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law’ [2006] OJLS 1, III.
9
R. Alexy, n 2.
10
As opposed to wickedness.
11
D. Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems (2nd edn., OUP 2010).
12
See for example the essay “The Rule of Law and its Virtues” in J. Raz, n 2, 220-221.
13
J. Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths’ [2001] American Journal of Jurisprudence 199, 201.
14
L. Green, ‘Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals’, [2008] 83 New York University Law Review 
1035, 1041.
8The second point to be noted on Gardner’s definition relates to a restriction of the arena of the 
dispute. It says that legal validity of norms does not depend on their moral merits but only on their 
sources. In keeping with the positivist tradition, a source here is to be regarded as a matter of social 
fact, a convention or custom which can be empirically ascertained and which authoritatively 
designates norms as legal ones (e.g. the practice of legislation, judicial precedent and interpretation, 
custom). As long as these sources or, in Hartian terms, “rules of recognition”
15
designate certain 
norms as valid, they are legally valid independently of the moral merits of their content. 
Non-positivists deny that these sources, customs or rule(s) of recognition are exhaustive of the legal 
validity of norms. Note that they do not deny their importance in the creation of legally valid norms. 
However, they argue that norms that contradict sound principles of morality cannot be regarded as 
legally valid. Now, non-positivists vary widely in their views about the exact relationship between 
moral and legal validity of norms. Some will argue that immoral norms which have been sanctioned 
by legal sources are not legal in the focal sense,
16
while others will outright reject their validity.
17
The 
reasons for these different views within non-positivism will be outlined at the relevant time in part 
2. At this point suffices it to say that non-positivists, not withstanding their internal disagreements, 
homogeneously contend that legal sources are not exhaustive of legal validity of norms. 
2. Objectives and Chapter Outline
In the previous section I outlined what I take to be the core of the disagreement between positivists 
and non-positivists about the nature of law. I identified the separation thesis as being the subject 
matter and restricted the contention to bear on the relationship between the validity of legal norms 
and morality. In this section I will proceed to illustrate my main objectives and illustrate how they 
are to be achieved in each section of the thesis.
I will divide the thesis in two main parts. In part 1 I will ask the following question: can an analysis of 
legal practice tell us a little more about the viability of the separation thesis? The source of this 
question lays in the abstract arguments often adduced by legal philosophers to sustain their 
positions as to the correctness of the separation thesis. While philosophical analysis is aimed at 
conceptual understanding of the elements under consideration, in the case of law, the element 
under consideration is one which is socially practiced. Therefore, because philosophical analysis 
attempts to make sense of that practice and to reveal its constitutive elements, ultimately it must 
                                                          
15
See Hart, n 3, V.
16
J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press 1980), XII. See also N.E. Simmonds, ‘Law as a 
Moral Idea’ [2005] University of Toronto Law Journal 61.
17
D. Beyleveld & R. Brownsword, Law as a Moral Judgement (2nd edn., 1994 Sheffield Academic Press). Also 
Alexy, n 2, and Radbruch, n 8, in connection to extreme injustice.
9also be susceptible to criticisms originating from closer observation of that practice. Consequently, I 
will challenge the intelligibility of the disagreements about the separation thesis by inspecting the 
practice of law in the context of counter-terrorism measures in the UK. The reason for focusing on 
this lays in the morally controversial nature of the UK counter-terrorism measures. A preliminary and 
intuitive moral judgement on some of these measures reveals that they defy common perceptions of 
principles of substantive justice and fairness. The morally suspicious character of these measures is 
therefore a good battle ground on which to investigate whether the separation thesis is to be upheld 
or rejected.
I will spend most of part 1 investigating whether the morally suspicious counter-terrorism measures 
were compatible with the rule of law. I will not directly tackle the question whether these measures 
were to be classified under positivist or non-positivist terms as legally valid or legally invalid 
measures. However, as I will show, they failed to comply with the rule of law. I will argue that non-
compliance with the rule of law is a specifically legal failure as well as a moral failure. I will also show 
that norms which contravene our common sense of substantive justice are those that violate the 
rule of law as this is built on a substantive moral concept. I will conclude that a norm which 
emanates from the sources of valid legal norms and yet fails to comply with the rule of law fails to 
belong to a system of valid legal norms because incompatible with the overall system of norms. It 
fails to be systemically valid. 
My discussion in Part 1 will reveal that disagreements about the separation thesis are often caused 
by neglecting features which an in depth analysis of existing legal practice would reveal. However, it 
would be misleading to think that it is mere empirical evidence that supports my conclusion. There 
are deep philosophical reasons why the rule of law is built on a substantively moral concept. In part 
2 I will tackle these reasons. I will show that it is impossible to understand law as a normative 
institution without an understanding of the scope and sources of the normative force of law. Three 
issues will need to be answered. Firstly, do legal norms, to count as such, necessarily need to possess 
normative force for those to whom they are addressed? I will answer the question in the positive. 
Positivists that have answered the question negatively fall into a paradox by doing so. 
I will then go on to investigate the source of the normative force of law. I will identify it in the idea of 
human autonomy. I will defend the idea that human autonomy is the specifically human ability of 
acting by calculating the consequences of prospective actions and pursuing the valued consequences 
according to a conception of human well-being. The idea of human autonomy lays the foundation 
for a sound ethical theory and helps us to resolve the problem of the normative force of law. I will 
show that norms, to be legally valid, must emanate from officials that recognise their subjects as 
10
autonomous beings and make possible the exercise of their autonomy in a community. I will show 
that there are substantive moral requirements which flow from grounding the normative force of 
law in human autonomy. These substantive requirements explain why the rule of law is built on a 
substantive moral concept.
I will then conclude by asking whether grounding the normative force of law in a substantively moral 
requirement implies that law is not morally fallible. I will argue that the law is morally fallible in 
different ways. However, the law cannot fail the moral requirement of the recognition of autonomy. 
Non-positivists that have defended a thesis which is incompatible with the above either adopt a 
misleading methodological stance or subscribe to an ethical theory which restricts the scope of 
moral requirements.  
The above paints a new picture of the source of the disagreements between positivists and non-
positivists. It reveals that norms, to be legally valid, do and do not need to be morally valid. The law 
is morally fallible, yet only in some specific ways. The source of the disagreements ultimately lies in 
the all or nothing character of the separation thesis itself. Once we understand that law, to be such, 
can fail morality only in some ways we immediately grasp that the separation thesis is misleading. 
The separation thesis ought not to be the battle ground of disagreements in jurisprudence. 
11
PART 1
TAKING LEGAL PRACTICE SERIOUSLY: LEGAL NORMATIVITY AND 
SUBSTANTIVE INJUSTICE
In disagreeing about the viability of the separation thesis, legal philosophers usually reason in the 
abstract. They ask and disagree about questions like these. Is the law morally valuable? Can the law 
do any moral wrong? What is the relationship between law and justice? To answer these questions 
they construct complex theories and then publish more complex books arguing amongst themselves. 
This is all well and good. Indeed, I myself will engage in a process of argumentation using abstract 
scenarios. Yet, this abstraction from legal reality, I will show, can do more bad than good to the 
arguments offered.  
Take for example this process of argumentation offered by Raz:
“The definitional approach has to explain away many counter examples. We are all sadly familiar 
with laws which are racially discriminating, which suppress basic individual liberties [...]. We also 
know of tyrannical governments pursuing evil goals through the machinery of law. Supporters of the 
definitional method would argue that though such cases are unfortunately all too frequent they fail 
to rebut their claim since by definition a bad law is not a law, or at any rate a government without 
moral authority is not law. This answer is, however, misconceived. All it shows is that the theory is 
consistent on this issue, not that it is correct. It is precisely because such obvious laws are ruled out 
as non-laws by the theory that it is incorrect.”
18
Much can be said about the viability of the refutation Raz attempts to offer. But one thing jumps to
mind. Raz speaks about the familiar set of laws which suppress basic individual liberties and of 
tyrannical governments pursuing evil goals through the machinery of law, without citing one real 
example of such laws or such tyrannical governments. One could say he need not. After all we are 
familiar with the horrors of the Nazi regime and the racially discriminating enactments of Apartheid 
South-Africa. This is granted. Basic knowledge of modern history reveals various examples which Raz 
can rely on. However, these examples are too general. They assume what Raz is trying to prove 
without examination and without offering evidence. For Raz to substantiate his point he has to offer 
a legal analysis of these familiar regimes and tell us how they succeeded in carrying out their 
immoral purposes through the machinery of the law. 
                                                          
18
J. Raz, Practical Reasons and Norms (OUP 1999), 164.
12
In this section I therefore attempt to depart from mere abstract reasoning and familiar examples 
which might be misleading. In so doing, I will take a more first person viewpoint and ask questions 
like the following. Is the law of my legal system morally valuable? Can the law of my legal system do 
any moral wrong? What is the relationship between the law of my legal system and justice? This is 
what I set out to do in the context of the British legal system. I will investigate the relationship 
between law and substantive injustice taking a special focus on the morally suspicious UK counter-
terrorism response. To counteract the terrorist threat the British government adopted various 
measures which resonate closely with the familiar regimes Raz needs to rely on to prove his point. 
These UK measures permitted the restriction of substantive and procedural rights of several 
individuals without resort to much justification. I will give a legal analysis of these measures in hope 
of reaching some conclusions on the viability of the separation thesis. I will argue that the morally 
suspicious measures were carried out through what can hardly be defined as the machinery of the 
law. 
My legal analysis will however have to be preceded by a defence of an idea articulated by Lon Fuller. 
Unlike various non-positivists, Fuller did not explicitly assert that immoral norms could not qualify as 
legal norms. Rather, he thought that a system of legal norms possesses a particular moral quality. He 
thought that a system of legally valid norms could possess this moral quality in various degrees, but 
complete lack of this quality resulted in something which could not be called a valid system of 
norms. Fuller’s idea was not received without scepticism. Indeed, his idea has been ridiculed both by 
positivists, in particular Hart and Raz,
19
and its reach seriously underestimated by various non-
positivists, including Dworkin.
20
  So I need to reformulate his idea in order to meet the objections 
levied against it. Therefore I will first explain, reformulate and defend the idea of an internal 
morality of law and then show how British practice in the field of counter-terrorism supports the 
validity and wide reach of this philosophically underestimated idea. In particular, I will show that it is 
by undermining the normativity of law, which contains the moral property of law, that gross 
violations of substantive justice have taken place in the British counter-terrorism experience. This 
finding should support a non-positivist conclusion of the incompatibility of legal norms with 
substantive injustice. For the purposes of part 1 I will assume that sound principles of morality 
include the respect for human rights as outlined in various human rights instruments. References to 
substantive injustice will therefore mean disrespect for familiar standards of human rights. In the 
end, I will conclude that Fuller’s idea shows that the separation thesis, as formulated by Gardner, 
needs not to be the central focus of jurisprudential disagreements.
                                                          
19
HLA Hart, ‘The Morality of Law’ [1965] Harvard Law Review 1281; J. Raz, n 12. For other criticisms of Fuller’s 
idea see the symposium published in [1965] Villanova Law Review 631-78.
20
R. Dworkin, ‘The Elusive Morality of Law’[1965] Villanova Law Review 631.
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1. The Internal Morality of Law as Legal Normativity
In The Morality of Law Lon Fuller defended an idea consisting of two propositions which have been 
largely disputed by his contemporaries. Firstly, he argued that certain principles which make the 
existence of legal norms possible are also moral principles. Secondly, he asserted that compliance 
with this internal morality makes legal systems more likely to comply with sound principles of 
morality.
21
  Fuller’s first argument has been opposed mainly through the criticism that the principles 
of the internal morality are not in fact moral principles but merely principles of efficacy. The second 
argument has been rejected based on the finding that compliance with the internal morality is 
"unfortunately compatible with very great iniquity.”
22
But what are these allegedly moral principles internal and essential to the legal validity of a system 
of norms? Fuller identifies eight of them:
“(1) The first and most obvious lies in the failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be 
decided on an ad hoc basis […] (2) a failure to publicize […] the rules [a party] is expected to observe; 
(3) the abuse of retroactive legislation […]; (4) a failure to make rules understandable; (5) the 
enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected 
party; (7) introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by 
them; and, finally, (8) a failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual 
administration. A total failure in any one of these eight directions […] results in something that is not 
properly called a legal system at all […]”
23
While Fuller thinks that the most essential of these principles is the last one,
24
I will argue that it is 
instead a generalisation of the first principle which makes the strongest case both for the moral 
quality of these principles and the connection between them and sound principles of morality. 
The first principle can be redescribed more aptly as a requirement for the normativity of legal 
norms. This might sound at first as a circular proposition until it is shown that normativity is a 
question of degree. In the introduction to this thesis, I said that a norm expresses what actions 
ought or ought not to be performed in a given scenario. This means that norms require compliance 
for actions in an established scenario. Consequently, in order to make actions compliant with norms 
we need to establish (1) what actions they prescribe and (2) to what scenarios they apply. It might 
                                                          
21
Fuller, n 7. The bulk of his argument is in chapters 2-3.
22
Hart, n 3, 207. Hart, n 19, 1288.
23
Fuller, n 7, 39.
24
Ibid, 209-210 where he says that “Surely the very essence of the Rule of Law is that in acting upon the citizen 
[…] a government will faithfully apply rules previously declared as those to be followed by the citizen and as 
being determinative of his rights and duties. If the Rule of Law does not mean this, it means nothing.” 
14
be difficult to establish both (1) and (2) which will make it difficult to take norms as guide for actions. 
This difficulty can be illustrated through the classic Hartian example of a norm which prohibits 
vehicles in the park.
25
We might not have difficulties in understanding what action the norm 
prescribes , it is in fact a prohibition; however, we might not be certain whether the prohibition 
applies to children’s tricycles while it might be evident that it applies to motor vehicles. This 
illustrates that norms can be more or less normative in the sense that they can be more or less able 
to guide our actions. 
Note that there is also another way in which norms, or better, a system of norms can be more or less 
normative. Different norms belonging to the same system might have an impact on the same 
scenario and only a combined reading might be able to guide behaviour to a specific outcome. 
However, a norm might require that “criminal sentences should be imposed by an independent and 
fair tribunal” while another might say that “the Secretary of State can decide the minimum period 
which might be served by a mandatory life sentence prisoner”. These two norms are obviously 
related. A judge who has to hand down a judgement will have to consider whether the Secretary of 
State can be considered as an independent and fair tribunal. He clearly sees that the Secretary 
cannot be considered as such. If he has to deliver a judgement without any further guidance, he will 
have to decide whether to follow the first or the second norm as both cannot be applied coherently. 
In fact the content of the second norm clashes with the content of the first so that a combined 
reading of both cannot coherently guide the judge to a decision.
26
I have illustrated that norms and a system of norms can be more or less normative, in that they can 
be more or less able to guide actions in given scenarios. I will now explain how this relates to Fuller’s 
idea of the internal morality of law. I said that a generalisation of the first principle is able to provide 
the best case for Fuller’s contentions. However, I first need to show that the eight principles can be 
collapsed into a generalisation of the first. 
Fuller’s first principle of the internal morality of law requires that there should be legal rules. In my 
generalisation this can be translated into a requirement of legal normativity or, in other words, into 
a requirement that a legal system should guide the actions of its subjects through legal norms. In this 
generalisation the second to the eighth principles are nothing else but ways in which a legal system 
can undermine legal normativity. As I explained normativity can be a matter of degree. Thus failure 
to publicise legal rules, lack of clarity, retroactivity etc. are nothing else but ways in which legal 
normativity can be reduced and norms are less capable of guiding the actions of those subject to 
                                                          
25
Hart, n 3, 124-127. 
26
See R v Secretary of State (ex parte Anderson) [2002] UKHL 46.
15
them. The issue of retroactivity, for example, undermines the normativity of law by requiring an 
action in a scenario after the relevant actions have already taken place. In this way retroactive rules 
are incapable of being guides to the actions of their subjects at the most relevant time. Note, 
however, that retroactive rules are normative for the officials that are called to apply them. Along 
similar lines, the eighth principle, i.e. congruence between rules as announced and administered, 
can be equally redefined as undermining legal normativity. Incongruence in fact undermines the 
confidence of citizens that their legal norms are in fact to be taken as the accurate guide to their 
actions. It is thus fair to conclude that the eight principles fall within one which is a requirement for 
legal normativity.
Now I can turn to Fuller’s contention that the principles of the internal morality are indeed moral 
requirements rather than merely requirements for efficacy as his critics so forcefully contend. The 
criticism in Raz’s words runs as follows: 
“The law to be law must be capable of guiding behaviour, however inefficiently. Like other 
instruments, the law has a specific virtue which is morally neutral in being neutral as to the end to 
which the instrument is put. It is the virtue of efficiency; the virtue of the instrument as an 
instrument. For the law this virtue is the rule of law. Thus the rule of law is an inherent virtue of the 
law, but not a moral virtue as such”
27
.
If this is to be translated into the terms I set out above, it means that legal normativity has by itself 
no moral value and is only instrumental to morality when legal norms prescribe morally valuable 
actions. This view has to face two challenges if it is to be viable. Firstly, it has to explain why legal 
normativity does not coincide with the moral principle of equality of individuals in a community. 
Secondly, it has to explain away the moral value of legal normativity in giving effect to moral 
principles which would otherwise remain in the world of ideas. I turn to each in order.
We cannot understand legal normativity without making reference to the context in which it 
operates. It is a social context in which individuals find themselves, willingly or unwilling, in constant 
interaction with each other and with the community personified in the modern state. In order for 
the community to be able to maintain its existence it must be capable of regulating the conduct of 
its members. The primary way it is able to achieve this is by setting general norms which establish 
what ought or ought not to be done in a given scenario. The consequence of this is that each and 
every member of the community that falls under the scope of the general norms is called to abide by 
them. 
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This is the germ of the morality of legal normativity: legal norms establish equal demands from their 
subjects and assume that they are all equally capable of performing their requirements.
28
The moral 
quality of governance through legal normativity is best understood in opposition to human 
discretion. While legal norms establish equal demands from all those that fall under their scope, 
discretionary governance can dispense with this notion of equality and arbitrate situations without 
substantive constraints and without consistency. The moral quality of governance of a community 
through legal norms therefore guarantees that there is at least one constraint to those who are 
invested with political power: all the individuals that fall under the scope of norms must equally be 
able to enjoy and be burden by legal normativity.
29
Note that this notion of equality is not at all extensive and critics of the Fullerian principle will be fast 
to point it out. The equality of legal normativity does not necessarily say that all the individuals 
belonging to the same community have equal rights and duties. It only prescribes that all those 
subject to legal norms should equally abide by them. Thus it is possible that a system of legal norms 
will establish more rights only for a group of individuals while others will have more burdens. Each 
member of the separate two groups will be equal inside the group; however the two groups will be 
normatively unequal. 
This leads to the second argument advanced against Fuller. His critics might accept that legal 
normativity has the moral value identified but then point out that the equality of subjection to legal 
normativity is compatible with substantive injustice: individuals might be equally slaves while others 
might be equally free.
30
Raz’s criticism will re-echo in a new form. The moral property of legal 
normativity is instrumental to the ends to which it is put. It will be instrumental to substantive 
justice when this is the end to which it is put. However, it can also be instrumental to substantive 
injustice. Against this, Fuller himself had something to say.
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In his “Reply to Critics”,
31
Fuller argued that characterising the principles of the internal morality of 
law as merely instrumental principles reveals a misunderstanding of the special role attached to 
legal normativity in the governance of individuals. Legal norms in fact make possible the realisation 
in a community of the principles of substantive justice which would otherwise remain in a state of 
social abstraction. “Moral principles cannot function in a social vacuum […]. To live the good life 
requires something more than good intentions […] it requires the support of firm base lines for 
human interaction, something that […] only a sound legal system can supply.”
32
In this functional 
role, legal normativity is therefore morally necessary. In this functional role, legal normativity is 
therefore morally necessary. But, one might ask, what are those moral principles that legal 
normativity makes possible? To answer this question we can take a look at a suggestion provided by 
Fuller’s most assiduous critic, HLA Hart.
2. The Minimum Content of Natural Law and Reduction in Normativity
It was Hart who argued that legal systems do not necessarily need to reproduce requirements of 
substantive justice. However, although there is no strict necessity, legal norms usually respond to 
certain extents to the demands of morality.
33
The reason for this is that, given certain truisms about 
human beings, certain rules are necessary if a community of individuals is to live together and 
survive as a community. Consequently, although only a contingent matter, legal normativity usually 
fulfils the Fullerian role of giving practical effect to moral demands. Human vulnerability is one of 
such truisms and if a community is to survive some individuals must at least enjoy a legal right to 
physical integrity. Furthermore, if the community is to prosper, at least some individuals are to enjoy 
legal rights that go beyond the basic right to personal integrity. Consequently, legal norms must be 
established to secure the property, basic rights and legal remedies for some, but not necessarily all, 
of the members of the community. Following this line of reasoning, it could be argued that 
prosperity of a legal system is directly proportionate to its legal commitment to reproduce demands 
of morality. 
How Hart could have thought that a minimum satisfaction of moral demands in a legal system is a 
merely contingent matter remains mysterious. The truisms he refers to about human beings, i.e. 
their vulnerability and limitations, are not contingent properties of human beings as such. One need 
not be an expert in anthropology to understand that vulnerability and limitations are ineliminable 
properties of our humanity. The following quotation should show where Hart went wrong: 
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“Yet though [human vulnerability] is a truism it is not a necessary truth; for things might have been, 
and might one day be, otherwise. There are species of animals whose physical structure (including 
exoskeletons or a carapace) renders them virtually immune from attack by other members of their 
species and animals who have no organs enabling them to attack. If men were to lose their 
vulnerability to each other there would vanish one obvious reason for the most characteristic 
provision of law and morals: thou shalt not kill.”
34
This requires three responses. The first is that human beings are not exoskeletons or carapaces and 
have not yet lost their ability to be vulnerable to each other. The second is that, should human 
beings evolve, in some futuristic world, into beings which cannot be harmed, they would lose that 
part of humanity which has been one of their most defining characteristic. Finally, and most 
importantly, denying that the nature of law depends on some of the defining properties of human 
beings can lead legal philosophers to an unforgivable mistake. Consider the following parallel 
reasoning: it is a truism, in the Hartian sense, that human beings are social animals. This is a 
contingent property, Hart would say, of humanity. Yet, it is this contingent property that makes law 
possible in the first place. It is the contingent but defining natural fact of human association that 
makes law necessary. Would it make sense to talk of legal systems constituted only of single 
individuals? I think not. Consequently, if the nature of law is intrinsically dependent on the nature of 
human beings,
35
it is a necessary characteristic of a community of human beings as such to provide 
norms which guarantee basic rights to their members. If these norms are legal norms then they will 
equally benefit those that are subject to them and will create an equal burden on those that have 
the responsibility of their fulfilment.
To this Raz and others might concede that legal normativity does in fact make possible the
realisation of sound principles of morality in legal communities. In this respect Raz and others will
point to the multiplicity of international human rights documents which make morally desirable
policies effective in legal systems. They will, in the UK context, recognise the fundamental role of the
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) which makes directly enforceable in domestic courts the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, they will continue to contend that legal normativity
is also compatible with the realisation of sound principles of immorality. They will point, as they
generally do, to the Nazi and Apartheid regimes and, to reinforce their point in a more familiar 
context, to various the counter-terrorism measures adopted in the UK which allowed restriction of 
substantive and procedural rights of various individuals. To respond to this, one has to show that 
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these measures were themselves not compatible with the requirements of legal normativity. This is 
what I set out to do in the rest of the part 1.
3. Legal Normativity and Substantive Justice: Pre-Belmarsh British Perspectives
In the last section I argued that legal systems necessarily protect basic rights of some individuals and 
by doing so reproduce requirements of sound principles of morality. Equality, which is the moral 
property intrinsic to legal norms, requires that these norms apply to all individuals. One could then 
ask how it is possible that, even in contemporary and democratic legal systems, not every individual 
is able to benefit from these norms. Sarcastically pointing to the control orders regime, Fullerian 
critics will ask how the violation of basic rights on the basis of mere suspicion was legally authorised 
for some individuals of a community. My reply is that these violations are the product of two 
strategies which are themselves violations of legal normativity. 
The first, which I will call the ostracism strategy, consists in casting out some individuals from the 
community by denying that certain basic legal norms apply to them. Nowadays, at least in 
democratic countries, no government can explicitly claim that certain individuals should be deprived 
of their basic rights. So a more subtle approach is undertaken. Governments claim that certain 
individuals enjoy full rights but they then fail, in a way or another, to apply the full normative value 
of these rights to the individuals. In the British context this translates into explicit or covert 
derogations from human rights regimes, in particular from the ECHR. 
The second strategy, which I call the shallow normativity strategy, consists in framing the norms that 
cause substantive injustice in vague terms thereby reducing their normative content. From this 
follows the dominance of executive discretion rather than full legal normativity. To understand the 
concept of shallow normativity let me return to the requirement of normativity. As I said at various 
points, norms establish what actions ought or ought not to be taken in given scenarios. These norms 
can be more or less normative as they can give rise to doubts about their relevance and modality of 
application. However, there is another way in which their normativity can be diminished. They may 
in fact establish that in a scenario (x) what actions ought or ought not to be taken are to be 
established by individual (i). This individual might also be responsible for establishing the scope of 
(x). What such norms establish is nothing else but an institutionalisation of the discretion of (i). We 
cannot thus take them as guide to our actions because they rely for their normative content on the 
discretion of (i). 
20
I will consider how each strategy has been adopted in the British counter-terrorism experience to 
produce substantive injustice. In this section I will confine myself to the anti-terrorism measures 
enacted under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATA) and to string of cases that 
preceded the seminal decision of Belmarsh.
36
In the successive sections I will consider the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 2005 which created the control order regime.
After 9/11, the British Parliament enacted in fast and fury the ATA. Section 23 provided for indefinite 
detention without trial of foreign nationals who the Home Secretary reasonably suspected of being 
involved in terrorism-related activity. Even before ATA was approved by Parliament, the 
Government had relied on art 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and sought 
to derogate from its obligation to respect art 5 ECHR (right to liberty and security of person). The 
Government thus issued the Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 to issue an 
art 15 derogation from art 5 ECHR for the purposes of domestic law. Art 15 ECHR reads as follows:
“In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting 
Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation […].”
This section illustrates two points. The first is that it permits what I have called the ostracism 
strategy. This section in fact explicitly deprives of any normative force the relevant provision which 
would have safeguarded the right to personal liberty of the detained. The right to personal liberty 
falls under what I have referred to above as the minimum content of natural law which is essential 
to the existence, survival and flourishing of a community. It is in fact a necessary consequence of the 
right to personal integrity. In the UK this right has been secured through the ancient writ of habeas 
corpus and enshrined, more recently, in art 5 ECHR which is domestically enforceable through the 
HRA. To achieve its morally suspicious purpose, the British Government had to deprive this 
fundamental legal norm of its normative content by explicitly seeking for a derogation. One might 
object that the Government was not in fact depriving art 5 ECHR of its normative force, but rather 
recurring to another legal norm, art 15 ECHR, which had full normative force. This objection brings 
me to the second point which art 15 illustrates. 
In order to undermine legal normativity we can either simply refuse to take legal norms as guides to 
our actions by ignoring their applicability, or recur to a norm which has negative dependent 
normativity. I will explain this last concept by recurring to a similar concept I illustrated above. 
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Remember I said that in order to understand what actions we legally ought to take, we sometimes 
need to make reference to more than a legal norm. So, for example, the normative content of (a) 
“whatever the Crown in Parliament enacts must be applied by courts” is specified by (b) 
“fundamental rights can be violated by statutes only if Parliament uses unequivocal words to that 
effect”. Now note that (b) adds normative value to (a) in that it clarifies the conditions in which (a) 
guides our actions; (b) is dependent on (a) for its normative force and adds normative value to it. 
Therefore (b) has positive dependent normativity. However, art 15(1) ECHR has negative dependent 
normativity as its only normative value is depriving other legal norms of their normativity. It cannot 
then be said that an application for a derogation under art 15 ECHR was giving effect to a fully 
normative norm. This is because art 15(1) ECHR has no normative value of its own.
37
It can therefore 
be concluded that the substantive injustice of internment without trial was caused by depriving a 
fundamental norm of its normative value and depriving certain individuals of its benefit (the 
ostracism strategy).
The relevant provisions of ATA also illustrate the second strategy which leads to substantive 
injustice, i.e. shallow normativity. I said that norms that have shallow normative value merely 
institutionalise the discretion of an individual by allowing the individual to decide when a particular 
course of action is to take place or when or whether a norm applies at all. Consequently, unless the 
discretion is exercised, we cannot take the norms as guide to our actions. I contend that the 
statutory provisions which led to substantive injustice for the Belmarsh prisoners had this 
characteristic. The relevant sections of ATA are as follows: 
“21(1) The Secretary of State may issue a certificate under this section in respect of a person if the 
Secretary of State reasonably-
a) believes that the person’s presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to national security, and
b) suspects that the person is a terrorist.
[…]
23(1) A suspected international terrorist may be detained [without trial] […]”
To understand how these norms have shallow normative value we need to look at the relationship 
between the two sections. It is sec 23(1) which makes legally possible the morally repugnant fact of 
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internment without trial. However, it is sec 21(1) which determines the scenario in which the 
morally repugnant fact is authorised. However, does sec 21(1) actually tell us when that fact is 
authorised? It does not. It simply leaves it to the “reasonable” belief and suspicion of the Secretary 
of State. Sec 21(1) therefore does nothing but institutionalising a discretionary decision of an 
individual by delegating its normative content to his discretion. We therefore cannot use it as a 
guide to our actions until an actual decision is taken by the Secretary of State. In this sense it does 
not seem incorrect to say that the substantive injustice that resulted from the ATA was not caused 
by the norms therein contained but rather by the exercise of discretionary power of the Secretary of 
State. 
Against this assertion two objections may be raised. The first says that the discretionary power is 
established by a legal norm so the cause of injustice is in fact the relevant norm. Against this, one 
only needs to remember that norms have varying degrees of normative value and that sec 21 has 
only shallow normative value as it does not tell us when the discretionary power will be exercised. 
The second objection denies shallow normativity to sec 21 because it clearly establishes that the 
discretion is to be exercised “reasonably”. However, this objection, if true, supports my thesis. In 
fact, if the discretion of the Secretary had been curtailed by a requirement of reasonableness, the 
normative value of the section would have increased and produced further procedural safeguards 
for the rights of the suspected terrorists. This issue will however remain as a moot point as none of 
the courts’ decisions in Belmarsh, whether at first instance or at appeal, considered the normative 
meaning of “reasonable” belief and suspicion. Rather, the courts were concerned with the strict 
necessity of the Secretary’s decision to apply for a derogation under art 15 ECHR. Surprisingly for the 
history of the British judiciary, the House of Lords was prepared to read art 15 ECHR, which I 
described earlier as a negative dependent norm, as not being also a normatively shallow norm. They 
were prepared to find that the Secretary of State did not have unfettered discretion and could not 
derogate from art 5 ECHR because it was not in fact strictly required by the exigency of the situation. 
By doing so they were creating opposition to the ostracism and shallow normativity strategies. I will 
explain why this finding was so surprising at the time (and perhaps even today) by making reference 
to a few decisions before Belmarsh.  
In a relatively recent article, Adam Tomkins retells the features of a story familiar to most public 
lawyers.
38
It is a story which is set pre and post Belmarsh. Before this landmark case, it is said that 
the British judiciary had the habit of refusing to question the discretionary power of the executive 
when it came to determining issues of national security. People familiar with the story will point to 
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the war time cases of Halliday
39
and Liversidge v Anderson,
40
then move on to illustrate the peace 






and the more recent case of Rehman
44
before finally 
arriving at Belmarsh. The central theme with variations in these cases is that determinations of what 
is in the interest of national security and the best way to respond to threats to the integrity of the 
nation is pre-eminently a political judgement better left to the executive and not to be interfered 
with by the judiciary. In essence, it is a political and not a legal question. Lord Hoffmann’s words in 
Rehman summarise at best this judicial attitude: 
“What is meant by ‘national security’ is a question of construction and therefore a question of law 
within the jurisdiction of the Commission, subject to appeal. […]. On the other hand, the question of 
whether something is ‘in the interest’ of national security is not a question of law. It is a matter of 
judgment and policy. Under the constitution of the United Kingdom and most other countries, 
decisions as to whether something is or is not in the interests of national security are not a matter 
for judicial decision. They are entrusted to the executive.”
45
Later on in his judgement he carried on outlining the various ways in which courts of law must 
refrain from interfering with the assessment of the executive. These limitations include dispensing 
with the ordinary standard of proof that apply in civil and criminal cases; not substituting the 
executive’s assessment with the court’s own unless Wednesbury unreasonable and generally 
allowing “a considerable margin to the primary decision-maker.”
46
Curiously enough, he asserted 
that these limitations and the need for judicial restraint are “not based upon any limit to [judicial] 
jurisdiction.” Rather, “The need for restraint flows from […] common-sense”.
47
These words 
strengthen my argument by showing two things. The first is that the British judiciary has traditionally 
extended rather than curtailed the scope of executive discretion in the area of national security, 
thereby decreasing legal normativity. The second is that it has done so without explicit authorisation 
of the law but merely on common sense requirements. These two points combined give rise to a 
conclusion which critics of Fuller cannot easily resist. If, as Belmarsh and other cases prove, cases 
involving threat to national security usually involve violations of basic principles of substantive 
justice, such violations cannot be reasonably said to result from compliance with legal normativity. 
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Instead, they are the result of unrestrained executive discretion which is caused by judicial 
deference (the shallow norm strategy). They are also the result of non-legally authorised judicial 
deference which deprives individuals of the legal rights that would otherwise protect them (the 
ostracism strategy). 
This leads us back to Belmarsh and to the reason it was so surprising at the time. In fact, breaking 
with its long deferential tradition, the House of Lords decided that the words “national security” 
would no longer automatically bar the courts from upholding the full normative value of the relevant 
legal norms. They were prepared to recognise the full normative value of Convention rights and 
interpret art 15 and 14 ECHR to dramatically curtail the discretion of the executive. In an 8 to 1 
majority, the Law Lords found for the prisoners. They judges held that sec 23 ATA was not 
proportionate to its aims of combating terrorism within UK borders as it did not apply to UK 
nationals who posed a similar terrorist threat. It was thus was not strictly required by the exigencies 
of the situation within the meaning of article 15 ECHR. Furthermore, it was not compatible with the 
prohibition on discrimination enshrined by art 14 ECHR. The Court thus quashed the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001  and issued a declaration of incompatibility under sec 
4 HRA.
While the outcome of the case sent a strong political message both to Parliament and the executive, 
the ratio of the case was however inherently contradictory in approach. In fact the majority found 
(Lord Hoffmann dissenting) that while it could scrutinise the legality of the executive and legislative 
response to the terrorist threat, it was a political and not legal question to decide whether there was 
in fact “a public emergency threatening the life of the nation”.
48
By doing so the judges were 
recognising normative value to only half of the requirements of art 15(1) ECHR for an appropriate 
derogation. In fact art 15(1) ECHR required both (a) the existence of a situation of public emergency 
and (b) that measures taken to combat this emergency should be strictly necessary.
49
By recognising 
only the normative value of (b) but not (a), the judiciary was to give rise to a confusion which would 
partially cloak the successive counter-terrorism regime with a “thin veneer of legality”.
50
The British 
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government could claim that it was legally entitled to find that there was a situation of public 
emergency, while in reality that finding was not dictated by any legal norm but merely the result of 
its unchecked discretion. It is therefore the lack of legal normativity substituted by a discretionary 
choice which led the British government to the occasioning of more substantive injustice under the 
provisions of the control orders regime. 
4. Absence of Legal Normativity Post-Belmarsh: The Illegality of Control Orders
The control orders regime was born as a consequence of the Belmarsh decision. The House of Lord 
had found that internment without trial of foreign nationals was in breach of Convention rights 
because discriminatory and not strictly required because not only foreign nationals could constitute 
a threat to national security. Consequently, the British Government withdrew its art 15 ECHR 
derogation and substituted ATA with the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA) introducing control 
orders for both UK and foreign nationals. This statute was, as its predecessor, rushed within 
Parliament, which could not scrutinise and discuss the Bill with the appropriate time. The 
consequence of this was that the provisions of PTA suffered considerably from shallow normativity. 
Furthermore, while the control orders regime gave the illusion of not having employed the ostracism 
strategy because no derogations from the Convention were required, I will argue that the only way 
to give effect to the normative content of the PTA was through a covert derogation from Convention 
rights. The executive, supported by the deferential attitude of the judiciary, largely succeeded in 
undermining the normativity of Convention rights.
51
Before I start my argument let me however 
present the essential features of the control order regime.
At the end of December 2011, the British government decided to repeal the PTA and substitute the 
control order regime with “terrorism prevention and investigation measures” (TPIMs). This is 
another story which is too undeveloped to narrate. The story I am interested in now begins in 
section 1 PTA where a control order “means an order against an individual that imposes obligations 
on him for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism.” Two 
types of control orders were ordained in section 1(2). The first, called derogating control orders, 
imposed obligations which required a derogation from art 5 ECHR and could only be imposed by a 
judge. I will not deal with these as no derogating orders were imposed during the life of the PTA. If 
they had been, I would have had more evidence to point out that substantive injustice was caused in 
the British counter-terrorism episode by the employment of the ostracism strategy. The second, 
called non-derogating control orders, could be imposed by a reasonable suspicion of the Secretary of 
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State (sec 2(1)) and did not require in appearance a derogation from art 5 ECHR as they could not 
result in deprivation of liberty of the suspects. Sec 1(4) PTA gave a non-exhaustive list of what 
obligations the Secretary of State could impose on a suspected terrorist. The following extract 
should suffice to paint the picture of their gravity:
“When the non-derogating control orders were introduced they were aptly said to involve 
deprivation of most of normal life. They included an eighteen-hour curfew (virtual house 
detention);
52
electronic tagging; house searches at any time; forced relocation (creating a form of 
internal exile [from friends and family]); geographical restrictions on movements; bans on visits by 
all non-Home-Office-approved persons; and prohibitions on all electronic communication.”
53
The severity of the obligations which could be imposed through control orders was judged by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Right (JCHR) to have far-reaching consequences for the 
Convention rights of the individual. The JCHR stated that: 
“The unlimited range of restrictions that can be placed on a person under a control order implicate a 
range of human rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) and the 
Human Rights Act 1998, including Article 3 (inhuman or degrading treatment), Article 5 (liberty), 
Article 6 (fair trial), Article 8 (private and family life), Article 9 (freedom of religion), Article 10 (free 
expression) and Article 11 (free assembly)”.
54
These extensive powers conferred on the Secretary of State allowed him in effect to subject to 
severe conditions individuals who had not been tried and found guilty of any wrongdoing 
whatsoever. This, if true, seems in clear violation of any reasonable standard of human rights 
protection. Yet, as I pointed out, control orders were imposed without the need to derogate from 
Convention rights. This indicates that they claimed to recognise the full normative value of 
Convention rights. If this claim was true, anti-Fullerians will be able to confidently affirm that 
substantive injustice was not a product of the ostracism strategy. They will point out that full 
normativity is compatible with great iniquity. Against this my reply will be twofold. Firstly, I will 
argue that the PTA suffered greatly from shallow normativity, so that if the claim of compatibility 
with Convention rights was true, substantive injustice was the product of unrestrained discretion of 
the Secretary of State rather than norms with high normative content. Secondly, I will argue that in 
fact the PTA was not compatible with Convention rights and the British executive succeeded, partly 
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helped by judicial deference, in undermining the normative value of Convention rights. I turn to 
these points in order.
4.1. Shallow Normativity in the Prevention of Terrorism Act
I already illustrated to some extent the wide powers that the PTA conferred on the Secretary on 
State. However, I was not quite precise as to the extent of the Secretary’s powers. Recall from earlier 
discussions that norms suffering from shallow normativity are unable to be taken as guide to action 
because they institutionalise the discretion of an individual. I contend that the PTA devolved to the 
discretion of the Secretary of State both the decisions of (a) when non-derogating control orders 
were to be made and (b) the severity of the obligations to be imposed. If this is true, as I will now 
show, it means that any violation of human rights that resulted from the PTA were the product of 
the discretion of the Secretary and not of norms having high normative value. The fact that the PTA 
lacked normative value in respect to (a) and (b) is easily proven by looking at the wording of sections 
2(1) and 1 (3-4) PTA. They are as follows:
“1(3)The obligations that may be imposed by a control order made against an individual are any 
obligations that the Secretary of State […] considers necessary for purposes connected with 
preventing or restricting involvement by that individual in terrorism-related activity.
1(4) Those obligations may include, in particular-[follows a long list of the obligations which may be 
imposed]
2(1) The Secretary of State may make a control order against an individual if he—
(a)has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-
related activity; and
(b)considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from 
a risk of terrorism, to make a control order imposing obligations on that individual.”
I took the liberty to underline the relevant words that make clear that it is left to the Secretary of 
State’s discretion as to whether any obligations will be imposed and the severity of those 
obligations. This should not be construed as a game of words. The wording helps us to understand 
that the norms in question have little normative value. In fact, reading the provisions, an individual 
who was worried about being subject to control orders would not be able to predict whether any 
acts he may or may not have committed might result in the imposition of any obligations. He must 
await the Secretary’s decision. This discretion should not be confused with that usually exercisable 
by enforcing authorities who may legitimately decide whether or not to enforce a statutory 
28
provision. Instead this entails whether or not the relevant provision applies at all to the individual. 
This is a clear disrespect for the essential moral property of legal normativity which I identified 
earlier: all the individuals that fall under the scope of legal norms must equally be able to enjoy and 
be burdened by their requirements. I think this is enough to illustrate that any substantive injustice 
which was produced by the control orders regime was a consequence of low levels of normativity 
and widespread discretion.
This finding should be reinforced by another one. The provisions of the PTA were not only 
normatively shallow but also, in serious respects, hypocritical. In fact section 3(1)(a) required that 
the Secretary of State, once he had decided whether or not to apply the relevant provisions, to ask 
and be granted permission by a court to make an order. This gives the illusion that, in some way, the 
discretion of the Secretary of State was curtailed by the principles of judicial review which would 
include giving effect to the HRA and Convention rights. Unfortunately, this was not the case. 
Whether a decision was taken to impose a control order rested almost exclusively on the discretion 
of the Secretary of State because the standard of judicial review, at the stage of imposition, was that 
his suspicion was not “obviously flawed” (sec 3(2)). This standard of review freed the Secretary of 
State in substance from the shackles of the principles of judicial review allowing him to make a 
decision virtually unencumbered (ostracism strategy coupled with shallow normativity).
55
Therefore, 
it can be concluded that it is the absence of decent levels of legal normativity in the PTA that made 
possible the imposition of non-derogating control orders and the breach of substantive principles of 
justice. This conclusion leads me to my second point, i.e. the employment of the ostracism strategy 
leading to substantive injustice. 
The imposition of control orders, as I have argued, was possible because the Secretary of State could 
exercise virtually unencumbered discretion. However, the PTA provided for some procedural 
safeguards for individuals subject to control orders. After a judge, under sec 3(2), had done little 
more than rubber stamp the Secretary of State’s decision she had to “give directions for a hearing in 
relation to the order as soon as reasonably practicable after it [was] made”. This hearing was 
statutorily provided for under sec 3(10).
56
In the hearing, according to sec 3(11), “the court must 
apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review”. However, the PTA provided for 
some considerable limitations for this hearing. In fact, suspects could not be provided with the 
evidential basis for the allegations made against them, not even in a summarised form, when the 
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disclosure of the evidence would be contrary to national security and the public interest.
57
This 
provision was usually employed to bar the suspect from knowing the case made against him as most 
of the evidence was labelled as security sensitive material. While the PTA provided that some special 
security cleared counsel could inspect the closed material and could make submission for the 
suspect,
58
they could not communicate in any way with and take instructions from the suspect once 
they had seen the closed material.
59
The resulting big picture was that some individuals were subject to severe obligations on the basis of 
a mere suspicion which they could hardly rebut because the basis of that suspicion was not made 
known to them. This appears to be in clear violation of any reasonable standard of human rights 
protection. Yet, by not introducing a derogation from Convention rights, the British Government was 
claiming to be giving full effect to the ECHR and not adopting the ostracism strategy. If this claim 
were true my argument that full legal normativity is not compatible with substantive injustice would 
be seriously undermined. I will now explain how my argument continues to survive unperturbed. I 
will show that the ostracism strategy was in fact adopted through a covert derogation in which the 
judiciary was a partial accomplice. 
4.2. Tampering with Normativity 
A British judge who is faced with the morally suspect provisions of the PTA will proceed on the 
orthodox view that she is bound to give effect to legal norms however immoral they appear to her. 
The relevant legal norms in this case are the provisions of the PTA and the HRA, in particular section 
3 and 4. The HRA imposes on her the obligation to give effect to the normative force of the 
Convention rights. Yet, she clearly sees that the norms of the PTA are incompatible with any 
reasonable standard of human rights. If she is to proceed under the orthodox view, the only practical 
solution available to her is to dilute the normative value of Convention rights or of that of the PTA or 
of both in order to square them together in some way. Alternatively, if she does not want to 
compromise legal normativity, she must simply declare that the PTA is incompatible with the 
Convention under sec 4 HRA. Albeit in this way she would be resorting to the ostracism strategy and 
allowing the injustice to continue, she would be sending a clear message to the legislature that the 
draconian provisions of the PTA cannot be given effect to without a considerable reduction in legal 
normativity. Yet, British judges refused to embrace this route and preferred tampering with the 
normative value of both set of norms either by modifying the normative value of the PTA through 
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sec 3 HRA or by failing to recognise, to its fullest extent, the normative value of Convention rights. 
This is evident in the saga of MB which I will illustrate.
When the first series of control orders were imposed, Sullivan J. was called in the first instance case 
of MB to rule on their legality under a sec 3(10) PTA hearing.
60
He held that the normative value of 
the control orders regime could not be squared with Convention rights and made a declaration of 
incompatibility under sec 4 HRA. His ratio was that sec 3(10) PTA was incompatible with a right to 
fair trial under sec 6 ECHR because the courts were prevented from undertaking a full review of the 
merits of the Secretary’s decision. He found that sec 3(10) PTA required him only to assess whether 
the material available to the Secretary of State at the time of his decision to impose a control order 
could give rise to a reasonable suspicion. Under that section he found that a judge was not 
authorised to quash the Secretary’s decision even if, at the time of hearing, new evidence had 
emerged which discredited the reasonableness of the Secretary’s suspicion. This, he held, could not 
be squared with the requirement of a fair trial enshrined in art 6 ECHR.
61
By issuing a declaration of 
incompatibility, rather than adopting sec 3 HRA, he was implying that he was not ready to 
compromise legal normativity and that Parliament needed to rethink its enactment. Yet, he 
acknowledged that the order would stand because it was authorised by an Act of Parliament which 
he could not void.
62
    
The Court of Appeal
63
chose a different route which was later confirmed by the House of Lords. They 
admitted that:
“It remains theoretically possible, where a control order does not interfere with any Convention 
right, that section 3(10) could be interpreted so as to restrict the court's review to the question of 
whether, when he took the decision to make the control order, the Secretary of State had 
reasonable grounds for doing so. That, indeed, is the natural meaning of the wording which speaks 
of determining whether any of the decisions of the Secretary of State was flawed. There are, 
however, cogent reasons for not giving section 3(10) such an interpretation.”
64
Those cogent reasons were identified in a need of a consistent ability for the court to review control 
orders independently of whether they did or did not restrict Convention rights. Thus “we consider 
that section 3(10) can and should be ‘read down’ so as to require the court to consider whether the 
decisions of the Secretary of State in relation to the control order are flawed as at the time of the 
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The Court of Appeal thus preferred to remedy one of the many defects 
inherent in the PTA by adopting sec 3 HRA to modify some of the normative value of the Act and 
making it less incompatible with Convention rights. Yet, while this reading down might at first be 
applauded, it is insufficient. 
Adam Tomkins has illustrated that the approach of the Court of Appeal was adopted in several first 
instance control order cases and has allowed the courts to quash orders which, thanks to material 
available at the time of a sec 3(10) hearing, made clear that the Secretary of State’s suspicion was 
unreasonable.
66
Yet, he admits that this increased reviewing role of the courts was not adopted in 
regards to sec 3(1) hearings (those where the Secretary of State seeks permission to impose a 
control order in the first place) and modification hearings under sec 10 PTA. These modification 
hearings took place when the Secretary of State decided, on his initiative or on request by the 
suspect, to increase or reduce the severity of the obligations of a controlee. The role of the court 
was “to scrutinise the necessity for those of the obligations imposed on the controlled person”.
67
Yet, unless the decision of the Secretary of State was either irrational or unreasonable, his 
assessment of necessity could not be interfered with.
68
This demonstrates that the approach of the 
Court of Appeal was merely a minor and insufficient mending of a statutory scheme which could not, 
unless modified in its entirety, claim to be compatible with the full normative value of the 
Convention. While minor modifications under sec 3 HRA of the normative value of the PTA could 
make it a little more compatible with the Convention, its core could be accommodated without 
distorting the normative requirements of Convention rights.  That core, which I identified earlier, is 
the possibility that some individuals could suffer severe restrictions based on a suspicion of 
wrongdoing which could not be verified. I will argue later that this is the central issue which the 
courts should have had regards to. If they had done so properly, they would have realised that 
adopting sec 3 HRA to mend the normative value of some aspects of the control orders regime was 
completely beside the point. Yet they continued to take this approach in the last instance decision in 
MB
69
and the related decision of AF (No 3).
70
Throughout its iter in the various appeal courts, the central issue in MB was whether the refusal to 
disclose important evidence to the suspect on the grounds of national security and the procedure of 
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the special advocates was compatible with art 6 ECHR. In the House of Lords the court found that, 
although the right to a fair trial required that a person be informed of the case against him and be 
permitted to respond to it, the ECourtHR had declared that it was not an absolute right and might be 
limited in the interest of national security.
71
However, any limitations had to be strictly necessary 
and could not deprive the individual of “a substantial measure of procedural justice”. 
72
While the 
Court of Appeal had held that the presence of a special advocate making submissions for the suspect 
was sufficient to guarantee a fair trial, the majority of the House of Lords disagreed (again, Lord 
Hoffmann dissenting). The Law Lords held that, since the statutory scheme permitted that the core 
of the case against an individual to be withheld from him, this could not be sufficient to guarantee a 
minimum of procedural protection. 
This decision was further clarified in AF (No 3), a decision which followed shortly after an ECourtHR 
judgement, A v UK,
73
which itself clarified the normative value of art 6 ECHR. In AF (No 3) Lord  
Phillips stated that: “Where [ ...] the open material consists purely of general assertions and the case 
against the controlee is based solely or to a decisive degree on closed materials the requirements of 
a fair trial will not be satisfied, however cogent the case based on the closed materials may be”.
74
Because the PTA, without modifications, could not be read as to always guarantee satisfactory 
disclosure to the suspect, it was held to be prima facie incompatible with art 6 ECHR. The court 
therefore had to decide what steps to take. They could have either issued a declaration of 
incompatibility leaving it to Parliament to amend the control orders scheme, or they could have 
modified this aspect of the PTA making it more compatible with Convention rights. They chose the 
latter and read into the PTA a requirement that the core of the case against a suspect needed to be 
disclosed to him. This was clearly a desirable outcome as it made some aspects of the PTA more 
compatible with reasonable standards of justice. However, my submission is that the court should 
have issued a declaration of incompatibility but not on the grounds identified in the case. I will 
explain why this is so.
4.3 The Core of the Case Against Control Orders: Covert Ostracism Strategy 
I identified earlier that that the core of the injustice emanating from the PTA resided in the 
possibility of imposing serious restrictions on the rights of an individual on the basis of a mere 
suspicion of wrongdoing which could not be substantiated. This core of injustice, before the 
intervention of the courts through sec 3 HRA, was made worse by a limited role of the court’s review 
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powers under sec 3(10) and a failure to disclose the core of the case to a suspect who could 
therefore not challenge the Secretary’s suspicion.
75
While eliminating these non-core adverse effects 
of the PTA was clearly desirable, it was not sufficient. By not addressing the core of the PTA the 
judiciary was in effect being an accomplice to the executive and Parliament in adopting a covert 
ostracism strategy. The judiciary was in fact implicitly claiming that the core of the PTA was 
compatible with the normative value of the Convention and that the rights which would protect the 
suspects had been exhausted. It is this implicit claim which I will now show to be untrue. I will argue 
that a proper reformulation of the argument that the imposition of control orders could amount to 
criminal charges provided the best case for showing how the core of the PTA was incompatible with 
the Convention, in particular with the civil limb of art 6(1).
One argument which was rejected in MB at the House of Lords was that the imposition of control 
orders amounted to a determination of a criminal charge.
76
In fact, and this is manifestly true, the 
Court established that the whole purpose of control orders was not to punish past criminal 
behaviour but to prevent the possible occurrence of serious future criminal behaviour (terrorism-
related activities). The rejection of the labelling of control orders as criminal punishment meant that 
individuals who were subject to them could not avail of the normativity of art 6(2) ECHR which 
provides for the presumption of innocence and of art 6(3) ECHR which provides for several 
procedural guarantees. The fact that control orders were not labelled as criminal charges or that 
their purpose was not punitive is however, under ECHR jurisprudence, not a conclusive question. As 
acknowledged by Lord Bingham, what constitutes a criminal charge under the ECHR is in fact an 
autonomous concept independent of contracting states’ intentions.
77
Ashworth and Strange have 
adequately summarised the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in the following way: 
“First, the court should look to how the proceedings are classified in domestic law--this will be a 
factor, but it is not determinative. Secondly, the court should consider whether the wrong requires 
proof of fault. Lastly, and most important, the court must have regard to the severity of the penalty 
that the person concerned risks incurring.”
78
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We already know that control orders were not classified under national law as criminal sanctions but 
as merely preventative measures. We must therefore turn to the second part of the test and 
establish whether the imposition of control orders required proof of fault. Quite clearly, they did 
not. In fact under sec 2(1) PTA the Secretary of State was entitled to make a control order when he 
had reasonable grounds for suspecting that an individual had been or continued to be involved in 
terrorism-related activities. He did not need to prove, not even in a sec 3(10) PTA hearing, that the 
individual had in fact engaged in any terrorism-related activity.
79
He merely needed to prove that his 
suspicion was reasonable. This might lead to the conclusion that the lack of an accusation of 
wrongful doing meant that the suspect was not being subject to a criminal charge but was only being 
the subject of some civil measures to prevent him from committing criminal acts. This was the 
conclusion reached by Lord Bingham in MB. His was the only judgement to deal substantively with 
the issue. He said: 
“I would on balance accept the Secretary of State's submission that non-derogating control order 
proceedings do not involve the determination of a criminal charge [...] the order made is 
preventative in purpose, not punitive or retributive; and the obligations imposed must be no more 
restrictive than are judged necessary to achieve the preventative object of the order.”
80
If we accept that the imposition of control orders did not constitute a criminal charge,
81
one must 
then ask whether they might have amounted to the determination of civil rights and obligations for 
the purposes of art 6(1) ECHR. Lord Bingham answered this question positively. He said: 
“in any case in which a person is at risk of an order containing obligations of the stringency found in 
this case […]  the application of the civil limb of article 6(1) does in my opinion entitle such person to 
such measure of procedural protection as is commensurate with the gravity of the potential 
consequences. This has been the approach of the domestic courts […] and it seems to me to reflect 
the spirit of the Convention.”
82
Now comes the crucial part. If we accept that control orders were only preventative measures then 
any conditions imposed must have been proportionate to the aim which they sought to achieve, i.e. 
preventing terrorism-related activities. These conditions did not only include the obligations which 
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could have been imposed but also, and more importantly, the conditions under which they could 
have been imposed. I have already illustrated the extent to which the British judiciary considered the 
question of the conditions under which control orders could have been imposed. The Court of 
Appeal in MB established that those conditions must include wider powers of review for the courts 
in sec 3(10) proceedings and the House of Lord declared in AF (No 3) that they must have included a 
minimum of disclosure of the core case against a suspect. However, the British judiciary failed to 
address the proportionality of the basic condition under which control orders could have been 
imposed, i.e. the Secretary of State’s reasonable suspicion. The relevant question which British 
courts failed to ask was the following: is it fair under 6(1) ECHR for a set of obligations which restrict 
several Convention rights of an individual to be imposed on grounds of mere suspicion of wrongful 
doing? This was what Lord Bingham should have gone further to consider in his judgement. Yet he 
failed to do so. Instead, he went on to consider, like the other Law Lords in that case, the fairness of 
the non-disclosure of the case against a controlled person during judicial review proceedings. I 
contend that, from a Convention perspective, had the question been asked, it required to be 
answered negatively. To understand this conclusion let me briefly illustrate some ECtHR cases with 
striking resemblances to the control order regime.
In Raimondo v Italy and Guzzardi v Italy,
83
the ECtHR decided that the imposition of terrorism 
preventative measures imposed on suspect mafia criminals did not constitute a criminal charge for 
the meaning of art 6(1) ECHR and was overall compatible with the requirement of fairness in that 
article.
84
These preventative measures obliged an individual:   
“to lead an honest and law-abiding life; not to give cause for suspicion; not to associate with persons 
convicted of criminal offences and subjected to preventive or security measures; not to return to his 
residence at night after, and not to go out in the morning before, a specified time, except in case of 
necessity and after having given notice in due time to the authorities; not to keep or carry any arms; 
not to frequent bars or night-clubs; not to take part in public meetings, etc.“
85
These obligations were, without doubt, extremely similar to those imposable under the control 
orders regime. They in fact allowed curfews, forced relocations and restriction on the use and 
enjoyment of property just as in the control orders scheme. The aim of the legislation was also 
similar because it sought to prevent the commission of terroristic acts (the Mafia is considered as a 
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terrorist organisation in Italy). One would therefore conclude that since the similar Italian regime 
was  held permissible by the ECtHR under sec 6(1) ECHR so should the UK control orders scheme. 
However, before such hasty conclusion, we must ask the following question: under what conditions 
were the preventative Italian measures justifiably imposable from an art 6(1) ECHR perspective? The 
relevant Italian legislation and case law was summarised in the ECtHR judgement and is as follows:
“Section 1 [of Act 575 of 31 May 1965] states that it is applicable to persons—such as Mr 
Raimondo—against whom there is evidence showing that they belong to “Mafia-type” groups […]. 
Because of their particular object, preventive measures do not relate to the commission of a specific 
unlawful act but to a pattern of behaviour defined by law as conduct indicating the existence of 
danger to society. As far back as 1956 the Constitutional Court ruled that in no case could the right 
to liberty be restricted except where such restriction was prescribed by law, where lawful 
proceedings had been instituted to that end and where the reasons therefore had been set out in a 
judicial decision. It subsequently ruled that preventive measures could not be adopted on the basis 
of mere suspicion and are justified only when based on the objective establishment and assessment 
of facts which reveal the behaviour and life-style of the person concerned.”
86
The Italian legislation, which was held compatible with the Convention, had therefore two 
characteristics which the PTA seriously lacked. Firstly, preventative measures could only be imposed 
by a judge. Under the PTA control orders were imposed by the Secretary of State with a rubber-
stamping permission of a judge. Secondly, and more importantly, the question to be addressed by 
the Italian court was not whether the relevant authorities reasonably suspected the individuals of 
involvement in Mafia-related activity. Instead, it was whether, taking into account past activities, 
present evidence, including circumstantial evidence which could be rebutted by the individual, the 
individual actually constituted a threat to public safety and would engage in Mafia-related activities 
if unsupervised. A recent decision of the Tribunale di Napoli (Court of Naples) usefully summarises 
what had to be established:
“Proof of dangerousness [or involvement in terrorism-related activities] of an individual […] must be 
shown on the basis of symptomatic or informative elements of such dangerousness, obviously 
subsisting before the time of determination [in a court], which are based on objectively identifiable 
behaviour: in order to impose the preventative measures it must be shown that there are facts, 
which can be objectively evaluated and controlled, that lead to a judgement, on balance of 
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probabilities, that the individual is a danger to society; suspicion, inferences and speculation are 
therefore excluded.[emphasis added by me]”
87
The legislation which was held compatible with the Convention therefore explicitly excluded the 
possibility of applying terrorism preventative measures on the basis of a suspicion that an individual 
might be a danger to the public. Instead, Raimondo and Guzzardi permitted imposing preventative 
measures after it was established that, on the basis of objective evidence, an individual was found to 
be, on the balance of probabilities and excluding suspicion, a threat to public safety. Needless to say, 
the PTA clearly fell short of this standard established by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
Lord Bingham in MB made reference to the Italian case law and saw that the Italian legislation was 
similar to the PTA in its preventative purpose and, to a certain extent, to the severity of obligations 
which could be imposed.
88
In AF (No 3) much of the Supreme’s Court discussion focused on Guzzardi 
v Italy,
89
a case extremely similar to Raimondo. Yet, the courts failed to ask the right question and 
give the right answer. By focusing instead on the issue of disclosure of security-sensitive evidence 
rather than the fairness of a test based on suspicion Lord Bingham was depriving some individuals of 
the benefit of a legal norm which would protect them. In short, he was adopting a covert ostracism 
strategy. I am not accusing the British judiciary of an intentional disregard to the relevant question. 
Indeed, as Aileen Kavanagh has recently argued, there has been a constitutional change from an 
excessive judicial deferential attitude to a more inquisitive one in the context of national security.
90
However, whether intentional or not, the effect is the same: individuals who had in law a right not to 
be subject to substantive injustice were deprived of their legal right.
5. Conclusion: Re-evaluating the Separation Thesis
I have argued that the substantive injustice that occurred by hand of the British government in its 
response to the terrorist threat was made possible by undermining the Fullerian principles of the 
internal morality of law. I have gathered these principles under a single roof which I showed demand 
that a community of individuals be governed through legal norms as opposed to human discretion. I 
argued that legal normativity in such community necessarily includes norms that guarantee the basic 
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rights of each individual. Disparity in rights and injustice are the occasion of undermining this 
necessity and ostracising some individuals from the legal community by depriving them of the 
normative value of norms which would otherwise protect them. I showed that the British 
government adopted this strategy either by seeking an explicit derogation from Convention rights 
or, with judicial contribution, by covertly undermining the normativity of Convention rights. Also, as I 
showed both in relation to the ATA and the PTA, substantive injustice was also a product of framing 
legal norms in ways which undermine their normative value and institutionalise human discretion. 
These norms cannot be taken as guides to actions and therefore possess only shallow normative 
value. Both strategies, as I showed, violate the moral characteristic inherent in all legal norms which 
is equality of rights and duties of the individuals who fall under their domain.
My discussion gives substantial weight to both of Fuller’s contentions in a British context. It 
delineates the moral characteristic of legal normativity and shows the direct correlation between 
disrespect for legal normativity and occasioning of substantial injustice. However, one final 
argument might be thrown against my conclusion. It says, in Razian terms, that I have made a 
promiscuous use of the rule of law (or legal normativity) by conflating it to coincide in essence with 
the rule of the good law. Much of my discussion has in fact focussed on how the morally suspicious 
pieces of British legislation violated standards of human rights protection. However, the rule of law 
“is not to be confused with democracy, justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human rights 
of any kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of man”.
91
It is merely the “principled faithful 
application of the law”.
92
This argument does not sting mine in two respects. Firstly, legal norms in 
the British constitution do, in fact, include respect for democracy, justice, equality and human rights. 
The principles of the common law, the HRA and the domestically enforceable Convention rights have 
indeed transformed the rule of law to mean the rule of the good law in the British context.
93
Secondly, and more importantly, the rule of law does always in substance coincide with the rule of 
the good law because, as shown, legal systems necessarily incorporate the minimum content of 
natural law. Inequality in rights is thus the product of unfaithful application of this minimum content 
and segregation of certain individuals from certain norms of the community. In order to counter this, 
anti-Fullerians must be able to demonstrate that legal systems do not necessarily need to 
incorporate the minimum content. I suspect that to find systems of legal norms that lack such 
content we might have to look, as Hart did, between communities of exoskeletons and carapaces. 
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This conclusion leads me back to the reason that inspired the detailed examination of the measures 
used in the UK counter-terrorism experience.  Remember how Raz could easily make reference to 
the Nazi and Apartheid regimes to prove his point that legally valid norms can be used for morally 
abhorrent purposes. Remember also that he did not advance any legal analysis of those regimes or 
of others which have a similar character.  I suspect that, if he had gone through the pain of an 
insightful legal analysis of the use of the law as an instrument of injustice, he would have found that 
in those regimes there existed a wide-spread disrespect for legal normativity. Several theorists that 
have gone through the pain of understanding how the Nazi and Apartheid regimes employed the 
machinery of law have reached my same conclusion.
94
So it seems that on closer analysis, both 
technically legal and philosophical, a system of legal norms, because to be such demands compliance 
with the moral property of legal normativity, is incompatible with a degree of substantive injustice.
95
If this is true it has insightful repercussions for the viability of the separation thesis.
Remember from the introduction to this thesis that the disagreement about the separation thesis 
rests on a disputed necessary connection between the legal validity of a norm and its moral merits. 
Gardner says: “In any legal system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence whether it forms 
part of the law of that system, depends on its sources, not its merits (where its merits, in the 
relevant sense, include the merits of its sources).”
96
Fuller’s contention, in my reformulation, does 
not of necessity invalidate Gardner’s separation thesis as its domain is wider. In fact it is mainly 
interested in the relationship between substantive injustice and a system of legal norms rather than 
a given norm. However, Fuller’s contention calls for a redefinition of the separation thesis in an 
important way which I now proceed to illustrate. 
A system of norms is composed of individual norms so, given Fuller’s contention, in any system of 
norms there must be individual norms that make possible the minimum content of natural law. Yet, 
positivism tells us that in that system there might exist individual norms that are incompatible with 
the minimum content. If this is true, there might exist in the same system a group of norms that are 
incompatible with each other. The first group gives effect to the minimum content while the other 
contradicts it. The norms of the two groups are, says positivism, all legally valid because they all 
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originate from the same legal sources. This intra-systemic incompatibility seems itself a violation of 
the requirement of legal normativity as subjects are not able, without contradictions, to take the 
norms of the system as guides to their conduct. However, one has to ask whether the violation of 
legal normativity arises via the clash of the two groups or, instead, whether it is the existence of the 
second group that violates the requirement of legal normativity. Clearly, it is the latter. Indeed, if 
Fuller’s contention is right, a system of legal norms exists to give effect to the minimum content of 
natural law. It follows that norms that are incompatible with the minimum content cannot belong to 
that system without violations of legal normativity. I have in fact shown that the only way they can 
be accommodated is through the employment of the ostracism and shallow normativity strategies. 
In other words, norms that are incompatible with the minimum content of natural law are 
systemically invalid. So after all, the separation thesis as expressed by Gardner appears to be 
incorrect.   
One strategy is open to positivists to defend their position. They can simply point out that the 
separation thesis is concerned with individual norms rather than a system of norms. They will point 
to the individual draconian provisions of the ATA and the PTA and claim that they were legally valid. 
This strategy however shows that the debate on the separation thesis is often carried on with 
blinders. On a positivist view, the provisions of the ATA and PTA may indeed be legally valid if taken 
in isolation from all the norms of the British legal system. However, as I have demonstrated, these 
provisions were incompatible with the overall system of legal norms in Britain. This means that, 
without any need to resort to a non-positivist theory along the lines of Finnis or of Beyleveld and 
Brownsword, these provisions were systemically invalid. Fuller’s lesson is therefore that 
disagreements about the separation thesis need to be reformulated or dropped altogether. We 
should not have disputes about the legal validity of morally abhorrent norms without first 
considering whether they are in fact systemically valid. Only after we have ascertained that neither 
the ostracism nor the shallow normativity strategies have been employed should we debate about 
the legal validity of such norms.
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PART 2
DISSOLVING THE CENTRAL DISAGREEMENT IN JURISPRUDENCE: GROUNDING 
THE NORMATIVE FORCE OF LAW IN HUMAN AUTONOMY
1. INTRODUCTION
I concluded part 1 of this thesis by showing that disagreements on the separation thesis are often 
conducted in a blinded context. Legal philosophers identify a single norm which they judge as 
immoral and disagree whether or not its immorality bans it from being counted as a legal norm. I 
argued, reinterpreting Fuller’s principle of the rule of law, that that disagreement is often 
unnecessary. Immoral norms are often illegal. They might emanate from the valid sources of legal 
norms in a system, yet fail to be compatible with the overall system of valid legal norms. They fail to 
satisfy the principle of normativity I identified. 
However, the reformulation of Fuller’s principles of the rule of law into the requirement for legal 
normativity, which I advanced in part 1, carries with it more assumptions than I have endeavoured 
to disclose. Why should a legal system be capable of guiding the conduct of its subjects through 
norms? What does it mean when this principle refers to ‘legal system’? Perhaps it refers to legal 
officials? Why does a particular principle of equality coincide with the moral property of legal 
normativity?  Why does that moral property not coincide instead, as some have proposed, with a 
particular conception of freedom?
97
These and a few more questions are yet to be answered. This is 
what I set out to do in part 2. 
2. DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT THE NORMATIVE FORCE OF LAW
I start tackling the philosophical puzzles of legal normativity by making a distinction between 
normative value and normative force of norms. As I will show these are two constitutive and 
inseparable parts of a norm, whether it is legal or otherwise. Until now I have referred to the 
requirement of legal normativity as the necessity for legal systems to be capable of guiding the 
conduct of their subjects through norms. However, this requirement goes only in one direction. It 
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goes from those that exercise political power in a legal system, i.e. the officials, towards those that 
are subject to that power.
98
However, normativity requires that those subjects be also capable of 
recognising the norms that the officials seek to impose on them. This requires, firstly, the 
satisfaction of the principles of the rule of law that Fuller articulated. However, it also requires a 
more basic element. It requires that the subjects have a reason to guide their conduct by the norms 
articulated by the officials. I call this requirement the normative force of a norm. 
The existence and scope of the normative force of legal norms is the central issue which gives rise to 
disagreements about the separation thesis. Positivists deny that subjects in a legal system should 
always have reasons to guide their conduct by the norms articulated by the officials. Whether there 
are any such reasons is a second order issue. Non-positivists forcefully disagree. They argue that 
there are conclusive reasons of a moral character for the subjects to guide their conduct by the 
norms articulated by the officials. When those moral reasons are lacking, generally or in particular 
circumstances, subjects cannot comply with those norms. This needs a little more explanation and 
needs to be connected to the understanding of the separation thesis I have advanced until now.
It might be recalled that positivists recognise as legally valid only those norms that originate from 
the sources of a legal system. Hart thought that we could identify the relevant sources by looking at 
the practice of the officials. This observation reveals that the officials hold a critical attitude towards 
certain unspoken rules, the rule(s) of recognition, which are determinative of the validity of further 
rules. He thought that it was this critical attitude which is the source of the duty of the officials to 
abide by the rules which are validated by the rule of recognition. Yet, Hart argued that it is 
unnecessary, though it might be beneficial, for ordinary citizens to have the same critical attitude 
towards the rules of recognition or towards the primary rules validated by the rules of recognition. 
He denied that legally valid rules necessarily impose duties or obligations on ordinary citizens, 
though they necessarily impose obligations on officials.
99
  He also thought that the obligations which 
were necessarily imposed on the officials by the rule of recognition were not necessarily moral in 
character, but merely conventional. For him the critical attitude of the officials towards the rule of 
recognition could “coexist with a more or less vivid realization that the rules are morally 
objectionable”.
100
Some post-Hart positivists have embraced and developed this conventionalist 
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view of the rule of recognition.
101
Others, including Raz, Gardner and Green, have abandoned it.
102
Yet, contemporary positivists hold the common view that norms that are in some way obligatory for 
officials need not impose obligations on ordinary citizens.
103
Raz has succeeded in convincing many that legal officials only necessarily need to claim that their 
norms impose obligations on their subjects. They need not actually impose any obligations. 
Furthermore, Raz believes both that the claim of the officials is a moral claim, a claim of legitimate 
authority, and that the obligations which are claimed to be imposed are exclusionary reasons for 
actions. This all means that, once the relevant officials have enacted a norm, through the relevant 
sources, they claim first that the subjects have a reason to perform the actions dictated by that 
norm. They also claim that all other considerations whether or not to perform the actions dictated 
by their norm are directly excluded by the fact that the norm has been pronounced by them.
104
One 
cannot stress enough that, according to Raz, the claim of the officials is not necessarily truthful. It 
might in fact be the case that subjects should never perform what the officials tell them to do. They 
will only have a real obligation to perform the actions dictated by the norms of the officials when 
there is in fact a sound moral obligation to perform such norms. Gardner explains it the following 
way:
“every legal norm […] is a putative moral norm: it is a proposal, on the part of the law, for tackling 
and resolving one or more moral problems. If the legal norm does that job well, then in the process 
it is absorbed into morality. It becomes a moral norm as well as a legal one.”
105
So both Hart and Raz, and their followers, believe that the norms which are dictated by the officials 
do not necessarily create an obligation for subjects to guide their conduct by them. In essence, they 
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claim that legal norms do not necessarily possess normative force. But how is this possible? Gardner 
puts it the following way: 
“If a norm is such that its existence doesn’t already entail that we have reason enough to engage 
with it, in what sense is it a norm? […] The simple solution […] is that something is a norm if it can be 
used as a norm. […] what does it mean to use a norm? [..] one can use something as a norm by 
applying it as a norm, and since one can apply some norms in a detached way […] there can be 
norms, the existence of which does not entail that we have reason enough to engage with them.”
106
The possibility of detachment from the obligatoriness of legal norms entails that legal norms do not 
necessarily need to possess normative force. Positivists assume that sound principles of morality are 
the sources of obligations.
107
Sound moral norms, always provide a conclusive reason for their 
subjects to act, i.e. they possess mandatory normative force. It follows that if legal norms necessarily 
possessed normative force they would need to comply with sound principles of morality. However, 
precisely because they need not possess normative force, they need not comply with sound 
principles of morality. Hence, the separation thesis: immoral norms can be legally valid.
Needless to say, contemporary non-positivists deny this conclusion. Finnis’ opposition has its source 
in a methodological premise. In the first chapter of Natural Law and Natural Rights he denies that it 
is possible to give a value-free description of the law as a type of social institution. He says that 
“A social science, such as analytical or sociological jurisprudence, seeks to describe, analyse, and 
explain some object or subject-matter. This object is constituted by human actions, practices, habits, 
dispositions and by human discourse. […] But the actions, practices, etc., can fully be understood 
only by understanding their point, that is to say their objective, their value, their significance or 
importance, as conceived by the people who performed them, engaged in them, etc.”
108
He then wonders how there is to be a general descriptive theory of these varying practices. He 
borrows from the Aristotelian tradition of focal meanings or central cases and applies it to law. 
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Controversially, he picks the central case of law in the instance where legal norms possess normative 
force, i.e. where legal and moral obligations coincide. He says 
“If there is a point of view in which legal obligation is treated as presumptively a moral obligation 
[…], then such a viewpoint will constitute the central case of the legal viewpoint. For only in such a 
viewpoint is it a matter of overriding importance that law as distinct from other forms of social order 
should come into being, and thus become an object of the theorist’s description.”
109
Finnis thinks that the term “moral” is of uncertain connotations so he prefers to use the term 
practical reasonableness. His central case is thus of those who appeal to practical reasonableness 
and are also practically reasonable.
110
Finnis’ main task is then to define the features of the practical 
reasonable person and apply the viewpoint of this person to the study of law as its central case.
It should be noted that Finnis does not affirm that non central cases of a concept are outside the 
scope of that concept in the first place.  He explains that “there is no point in denying that the 
peripheral cases are instances [of the relevant concept] [..] Indeed, the study of them is illuminated 
by thinking of them as watered-down versions of the central cases.”
111
It comes then with no 
surprise that he does not acknowledge as problematic the allegedly Thomist slogan “lex injusta non 
est lex”.
112
  For Finnis, and for his reinterpretation of the classic Thomist tradition, immoral norms 
can be legally valid, although in a peripheral, non central case, sense.
113
His non-positivism is 
therefore primarily methodological. 
Yet, Finnis’ methodological choice is inspired by the belief that it is essential and primary to 
understand legal norms when they possess normative force for their subjects, i.e. when subjects 
have a reason to guide their conduct by the norms enacted by the officials.
114
Truthfully, the class of 
the subjects Finnis is interested in is that of practically reasonable subjects. However, implicit in this 
interest is the Fullerian idea that there is an essential component of reciprocity between legal 
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officials and their subjects.
115
Fuller accused positivists of advocating a managerial role of legal 
officials in a legal system where subjects were only at the receiving end of the officials’ norms. 
Instead Fuller held a reciprocity view; both officials and subjects are involved in a common 
enterprise, that of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules, underpinned by a 
requirement of reciprocity.
116
I will later argue that Fuller was only half right and that positivists, by 
denying the necessity of the normative force of norms enacted by officials, are committed to a 
contradictory view that there is no active relationship between officials and subjects. For now, I 
want to briefly illustrate that Beyleveld and Brownsword, just as Finnis, are primarily interested in 
the ability of legal norms to have normative force for their subjects. However, they have approached 
the requirement of the normative force of law in a different way from Finnis which has led to a hard 
non-positivism.
Beyleveld and Brownsword are sceptical of Finnis’ methodology. They agree that the central case of 
law has to be understood from the point of view of the practically reasonable person, i.e. a person 
who takes law as a guide to his action. This agreement already reveals their commitment to the 
Fullerian view that both officials and subjects are engaged in a reciprocal enterprise of governance 
through rules. However, they accuse Finnis of arbitrarily choosing as the central case a practically 
reasonable person who is already committed to the principles of sound morality.
117
They advocate 
instead that, if a theory of natural law is tenable, it must be shown that a commitment to sound 
principles of morality is necessary for any practically reasonable person.
118
This methodological 
stance is termed transcendental essentialism. Furthermore, Beyleveld and Brownsword argue that a 
particular conception of morality, illustrated by the moral philosopher Alan Gewirth,
119
is in fact a 
presupposition of any practically reasonable person.
120
It follows that this ethical Gewirthian system 
is at the foundation of the normative force of law. Violation of this ethical system by the norms 
enacted by officials results in something which cannot be called law simply because it lacks 
normative force. Thus the denial of the separation thesis: “A law is a rule which it is Morally 
legitimate to posit for attempted enforcement”.
121
From the above it can be deducted that the source of the disagreements concerning the separation 
thesis primarily rests on the question whether legal norms necessarily possess normative force for 
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the subjects to whom they are addressed. Positivists deny this necessity while non-positivists affirm 
it. Furthermore, both positivists and non-positivists believe that the possibility of the normative 
force of law is conferred by the conclusive normative force of sound principles of morality. Positivists 
can deny that legal norms necessarily have normative force for the subjects by focusing only on the 
obligatoriness of legal norms for the officials. Yet, as I have noted, there is still an ongoing debate 
within positivism as to the nature of the obligatoriness of norms for officials.
122
They reject that this 
obligation is exclusively a moral obligation and some argue it is only a conventional one. They are 
however unanimous in finding that the subjects are not under any moral obligation to guide their 
conduct on the basis of these norms. Positivists therefore reject the Fullerian idea, which non-
positivists are committed to, of a reciprocal relationship between officials and subjects. 
If we are to resolve the central disagreement in jurisprudence it is necessary to firstly ascertain 
whether legal norms necessarily possess normative force for subjects. In order to do this I will have 
to once again establish whether Fuller was right and whether it is essential for our understanding of 
the nature of law to be committed to a relationship of reciprocity between officials and subjects. I 
will argue that Fuller was right and that positivists, by denying this commitment, fall into an internal 
contradiction. I will call this argument the argument from community. 
Secondly, having established that a communitarian view of law is necessary, I will move on to 
investigate the thesis, which both positivists and non-positivists rely on, that the normative force of 
law depends on the conclusive normative force of sound principles of morality. In order to do this I 
will venture into moral theory and ascertain what the source of moral obligation is and whether the 
law necessarily borrows from it. I will argue that the source of both moral and legal obligations lies in 
the idea of human autonomy and in its necessary pre-condition which is effective agency. Legal 
obligation is made possible by the recognition of the human autonomy and effective agency of the 
subjects of legal norms. I will show that legal obligation does not necessarily always coincide with 
moral obligation; rather a specific moral obligation is a necessary pre-condition for legal obligation. I 
call this argument the argument from normativity. 
I will then conclude by making a methodological argument about the normative force of law. I will 
argue that the normative force of law, and hence legal validity, has to be understood from the 
perspective of those that are subject to norms enacted by officials. I will show that, from this 
perspective, the normative force of legal norms is variable. In a political system there might be 
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individuals for whom these norms possess normative force and others for whom they necessarily 
cannot. Hence legal validity can vary between subjects in the same political system. I will call this the 
argument from the subjects’ point of view. 
I now proceed to discuss these three arguments in turn.
3. THE ARGUMENT FROM COMMUNITY
The argument from community starts by exposing a paradox which positivists encounter by 
defending the separation thesis. I will call this the paradox of effectiveness. I will show that 
contemporary positivists, by neglecting the communitarian view advanced by Fuller, fall into this 
paradox. If this is to be resolved, contemporary positivists will have to admit that legal norms 
necessarily possess normative force. I now proceed to show in what this paradox consists of.
3.1.The Paradox of Effectiveness
Positivists have long drawn a distinction between the legal validity of norms and their effectiveness 
in a legal system. By effectiveness I mean that norms enacted by the officials are generally applied 
by the officials and complied with by the subjects. The exact relationship between legal validity and 
effectiveness, however, has been controversial. Kelsen thought that effectiveness is a pre-condition 
for legal validity. He said: 
“[…] the validity of a legal norm [is] not identical with its effectiveness; the effectiveness of a legal 
order as a whole and the effectiveness of a single legal norm are […] the condition for the validity; 
effectiveness is the condition in the sense that a legal order as a whole, and a single legal norm, can 
no longer be regarded as valid when they cease to be effective.”
123
This fitted with his notion of legal validity. A norm was legally valid if, and only if, its mode of 
creation was in accordance with a higher norm. In turn this higher norm was traceable to another 
one in a continuous chain to the constitution of the legal system. The legal validity of this 
constitution was not authorised by a higher posited norm but only by a presupposed norm, the basic 
norm, which says that one ought to behave as the constitution prescribes.
124
While the basic norm is 
the ultimate source of legal validity and only a presupposition, it validates an actually posited 
constitution. In order to ascertain the content of the ultimate source of legal validity one therefore 
has to identify the constitution which is “established by legislative act or custom, and is effective. A 
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constitution is ‘effective’ if the norms created in conformity with it are by and large applied and 
obeyed.”
125
  So it is in this sense that, for Kelsen, effectiveness was a pre-condition for legal validity: 
the ultimate source of legal validity had to refer to a posited norm, the constitution, which was by 
and large effective; without an effective constitution we could not have the ultimate source of legal 
validity.
Hart was adamant in moving away from this model. He famously rejected the criteria of legal validity 
as a presupposed norm and, instead, replaced it with the rule of recognition, which is a socially 
practiced norm.
126
He also rejected the Kelsenian relationship between legal validity and legal 
effectiveness. For him a norm was legally valid only if it was effective within the practice (i.e. a social 
rule) of the officials and need not be effective amongst the population at large.
127
While he thought 
that the existence of a legal system depended on the effectiveness of legal norms both within 
officials and subjects,
128
he explicitly disavowed the view of a necessary conceptual relationship 
between the effectiveness of norms within the population and the legal validity of those norms.
129
As long as norms were recognised as valid by the rule of recognition, i.e. effective within the groups 
of officials, their ineffectiveness in the group of the subjects did not bar their legal validity. In Hart’s 
words:
“It would however be wrong to say that statements of validity ‘mean’ that the system is generally 
efficacious. For though it is normally pointless or idle to talk of the validity of a rule of a system 
which has never established itself or has been discarded, none the less it is not meaningless nor is it
always pointless. […] One way of nursing hopes for the restoration of an old social order destroyed 




The above speaks for itself. Fuller was less than half right when he accused Hart of holding a 
managerial view of law. The extract just quoted indicates that for Hart it is perfectly possible, 
although not normal, to speak of legally valid norms that are addressed to no one, except the group 








Ibid, 116 where he says: “There are therefore two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the 
existence of a legal system. On the one hand, those rules of behaviour which are valid according to the 
system’s ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and on the other hand, its rules of recognition 
specifying the criteria of legal validity […] must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official 
behaviour by its officials. The first condition is the only one which private citizens need satisfy […]” It is 
fundamental to note that the existence of a legal system and the criteria of legal validity, for Hart, are two 






of officials. Here lies the paradox: Hart’s view of legally valid norms is compatible with a scenario 
where all the relevant officials of a legal system reside in a perpetually locked tower without the 
possibility of communicating with their subjects. The paradox does not only consist of the ensuing 
alienation of the subjects from their officials.
131
It consists in the fact that in this scenario it would be 
incoherent to speak of officials of a system at all. A simple dictionary search highlights the 
conceptual connection of an official to a representative. There can be no representatives without a 
body of people to represent. The only way it would be coherent to speak of officials in the locked 
tower scenario is by regarding the officials in both their capacity as norm makers and, at the same 
time, as the subjects of those norms. Yet, it is clear that they cannot be regarded as the officials or 
representatives of the group of individuals outside the locked tower. In essence, the paradox of 
effectiveness isolates the practice of officials from its purpose. That purpose, simply said, is to tell 
their subjects how they ought or ought not to behave. In more complex terms, the purpose of the 
officials is to provide their subjects with norms possessing normative force.
If Hart is to escape the paradox of effectiveness he has to move to a Fullerian communitarian view. 
This view says that officials and subjects are engaged in a common enterprise, that of subjecting 
human conduct to the governance of rules, with a requirement of reciprocity. This requirement 
entails that subjects have the possibility and reason to use the norms enacted by the officials as a 
guide to their conduct. This necessarily negates the possibility of the locked tower scenario. This also 
necessitates that legally valid norms possess normative force. Legal or perhaps moral and political 
philosophy will then have to define the scope of this necessary normative force. However, it is open 
to Hart to reject this step. He could join in with Raz and assert that officials need only to claim that 
legal norms possess normative force while the norms might in fact not possess any normative force. 
After all, it is perfectly intelligible to speak of a group of individuals who claim to be the 
representatives of a group while they fail, more often than not, in their representative functions. It 
would then be open to Hart a way to avoid the paradox of effectiveness. But this Razian way, as I will 
show, fails. In fact Raz’s theory of the relationship between effectiveness and legal validity is 
incompatible with his theory of law’s claim to legitimate authority.
Raz initially seems to endorse the Hartian conception of legal validity. For him legal validity is linked 
to a conception of effectiveness only in the group of law-applying officials. The following extract 
seems to indicate just that: 
                                                          
131
An interesting article in this respect is M. Wilkinson, ‘Is Law Morally Risky? Alienation, Acceptance and Hart’s 
Concept of Law’ [2010] OJLS 441.
51
“Efficacy, however, is relevant only in so far as it affects the practices of the law-applying 
institutions. If, for example, the courts consistently refuse to act on a law, that law is not part of the 
legal system the courts operate, despite the fact that it was lawfully enacted and was never 
repealed. […] According to this approach, then, the existence of the law is logically related to the 
practice of the law applying organs. The condition of a law’s membership in a legal system is, 
however, counterfactual: if presented with the appropriate case the courts would act on the law. 
This may be true even though they are never - or seldom - presented with the appropriate case. […] 
Therefore a law may be valid even though it is largely inefficacious.”
132
It appears that Raz endorses the Hartian conception of legal validity and, with it, the paradox of the 
locked tower scenario where officials are incapable of communicating with individuals outside the 
tower. His reference to law applying institutions never been presented with cases to adjudicate 
seems to indicate that interpretation. However, this does not appear to be compatible with his 
fundamental thesis that officials claim to possess legitimate authority over their subjects. 
“If the claim to authority is part of the nature of law, then whatever else the law is it must be 
capable of possessing authority. A legal system may lack legitimate authority. If it lacks the moral 
attributes required to endow it with legitimate authority then it has none. But it must possess all the 
other features of authority, or else it would be odd to say that it claims authority. To claim authority 
it must be capable of having it […]”
133
The above seems to explicitly exclude the possibility of the locked tower scenario because the 
relevant officials, being unable to communicate at all with the individuals outside the tower, cannot 
claim authority over them. This is confirmed a little later in the text above when Raz excludes the 
possibility of trees claiming authority on the ground that they cannot communicate with anyone.
134
One must then conclude, given his thesis about legitimate authority, that Raz cannot coherently 
share Hart’s view of the relationship between legal validity and legal effectiveness because legal 
officials must intelligibly be able to make a claim to legitimate authority. Officials can only make that 
claim when they have subjects to address. It follows that norms enacted by officials, in order to be 
capable of possessing authority, necessarily have to possess normative force; i.e. they must provide 
their subjects reasons for taking norms as a guide to their actions. Unless Raz is prepared to drop the 
necessity of law’s claim to authority, he is already committed to a Fullerian view of a reciprocal 
relationship between officials and subjects. It follows that only norms that can be considered as 
having normative force for their subjects can intelligibly be held to be legally valid.
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I might be accused of having missed Raz’s point about the law’s claim to legitimate authority. In fact 
Raz asserts that it must be intelligible to attribute a claim of legitimate authority to legal officials, not 
that officials necessarily possess legitimate authority. In fact, Raz himself argues that there is no 
general obligation to obey the law, hence subjects do not necessarily possess reasons to guide their 
conduct by the norms enacted by the officials.
135
The claim to legitimate authority only helps us to 
identify legal officials and consequently, by investigating the sources the officials rely on, legally valid 
norms. I accept that this is a correct statement of Raz’s position. However, it is Raz himself that 
establishes a necessary link between the claim to legitimate authority and a requirement of 
reciprocity between officials and subjects. Consider the following extract:
“I will assume that necessarily law, [in] every legal system which is in force anywhere, has de facto 
authority. That entails that the law either claims that it possesses legitimate authority or is held to 
possess it, or both. I shall argue that though a legal system may not have legitimate authority, or 
though its legitimate authority may not be as extensive as it claims, every legal system claims that it 
possesses legitimate authority.”
136
So there is close conceptual connection between claiming legitimate authority and possessing de 
facto authority. Raz borrows the concept of de facto authority from the anarchist theorist Wolff who 
explains the notion of de facto states as follows: 
“What can be inferred from the existence of de facto states is that men believe in the existence of 
legitimate authority, for of course a de facto state is simply a state whose subjects believe it to be 
legitimate (i.e. really to have authority which it claims for itself). They may be wrong. Indeed, all 
beliefs in authority may be wrong […]”.
137
De facto authority is therefore a pre-condition of an intelligible claim to legitimate authority. But de 
facto authority already puts one in the Fullerian reciprocity view. In fact, de facto authority requires 
subjects to believe they have a reason, which might be illusionary, wrong or right, superficial or 
deep, to take the norms enacted by their officials as guide to their actions. 
If the above is right, both Hart and Raz are committed, on pain of paradox or contradiction, to accept 
the Fullerian conception of reciprocity between officials and citizens. This view says that norms, to 
be legally valid, necessarily possess normative force for their subjects. It is important to make clear, 
however, that this communitarian view I have just established does not say that subjects are 
necessarily justified in holding that view. It explicitly says that the belief of the subjects might be, on 
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closer inspection, morally wrong or unreasonable. If this is so, positivists ought not to worry as the 
separation thesis might still be preserved. Legal norms, while necessarily possessing normative 
force, might be incompatible with sound principles of morality. In fact the normative force of the 
norms enacted by the officials would not necessarily be based on sound moral principles but on a 
mere belief of the subjects in the legitimate authority of the officials. But any conclusion at this point 
would be too hasty. One has to first investigate the content of the subjects’ belief of legitimate 
authority. In other words, one has to understand the possibility of the subjects taking the norms 
enacted by the officials as guide to their action. It might be that, on closer analysis, the content of 
this belief actually bars all immoral norms enacted by the officials from having normative force. Or it 
might not. In the next section I illustrate the questions that need to be answered in order to 
ascertain the content of this belief.
3.2.The Other Wills Question
The last section concluded by showing that Hart is committed, on pain of a paradox, to the view that 
legal norms necessarily possess normative force for their subjects. It also showed that Raz is 
committed to the same view as his thesis about the officials’ claim to legitimate authority is 
conceivable only where officials’ already possess de facto authority. De facto authority entails that 
subjects believe that they have reasons to take the norms enacted by their officials as guide to their 
conduct. One then has to explain the possibility of this belief. Is it a false belief? What does it entail? 
I will put forward three possibilities. I will quickly discard the first. Cast doubts, but not totally reject, 
the second and then illustrate how the third has the most compelling power. I will call the third the 
other wills question.
Perhaps the reason subjects hold this belief is that they have developed a habit to do whatever their 
officials tell them to do. The norms enacted by their officials tell them not to kill, not to steal and to 
pay taxes and they do just that out of the long held habit that they ought to do what the norms 
enacted by their officials say. But this will not do. In fact habits, as Hart famously suggested,
138
cannot explain the normative force of law. The idea that subjects obey out of habit does not tell us 
how that habit formed in the first place. If the idea of habit implies unreflective and recurrent 
behaviour, as it usually does, it seems to conflict directly with the belief that there are reasons to 
take the norms of the officials as guide to one’s actions. The conflict is therefore between 
unreflective behaviour and reasons. The requirement of the normative force of legal norms 
therefore directly excludes this possibility.  At best, it allows that, once appropriate reasons for 
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taking the officials’ norms as guides to action have developed, subjects do not usually reassess those 
reasons every time they encounter a new norm. But this can hardly be called a habit.
If habits cannot explain the normative force of law, we might turn to another suggestion which says 
that subjects believe they have a reason to take norms enacted by the officials as guides to their 
actions because they fear the threat of sanctions. If they do not do as the officials’ norms tell them 
to do they will be thrown into prison, they will be beaten or might even be killed. We know that 
Austin proposed something similar to this view in his theory of law as commands backed by threats 
of sanctions and that Hart made his fame by rejecting it. Yet, and this is easily confused, Hart 
thought that the command theory was incapable of explaining the normative force of law for the 
officials, not for the subjects. Hart explicitly said that 
“In an extreme case the internal point of view with its characteristic normative use of legal language 
(‘This is a valid rule’) might be confined to the official world. In this more complex system, only 
officials might accept and use the system’s criteria of legal validity. The society in which this was so 
might be deplorably sheeplike; the sheep might end in the slaughter-house”.
139
The above would suggest that Hartian arguments against sanctions as the basis of the normativity of 
law cannot be of much help. Indeed, by embracing the idea that the normative force of law could be 
confined to the official world, as I have shown, Hart falls into the paradox of effectiveness. So there 
is a real possibility that sanctions could be at the foundation of the normative force of law. 
Perhaps another argument might establish that sanctions cannot ground the normative force of 
norms enacted by officials. This alternative argument claims that sanctions are not inherent in the 
nature of law and therefore cannot ground the normative force of law. In brief, the argument says 
that the normative force of law, which is an essential property of legal norms, cannot be grounded in 
a non-essential property such as sanctions.
The majority of post-Hart positivists and non-positivists have denied that sanctions are conceptually
necessary features of legal norms.
140
One common argument says that sanctions can at best be 
considered part of the law because human beings have a natural inclination to disobey orders (which 
are a special category of norms). However, so the argument continues, it is possible to imagine that 
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human beings will evolve into different beings in the future or it is possible to imagine a legal system 
of angels where sanctions would not be needed.
141
It follows that sanctions are not essential 
elements of the nature of law but merely dependent on some contingent human properties. 
However, I have already shown that this kind of argument does not work as the nature of law is 
intrinsically linked to the defining features of humanity.
142
If, as all these philosophers seem to 
accept, a natural inclination to disobey orders is a defining feature of humanity, we cannot explain
sanctions away as merely contingent properties of law. In fact sanctions will be an essential property 
of law as they are meant to countenance a defining feature of humanity (i.e. a natural inclination for
disobedience of orders).
143
So there remains the possibility that the threat of sanctions might, all 
things considered, explain the possibility of the normative force of law. However, two arguments 
seem to limit this conclusion.
The first argument, which again was famously exposed by Hart, says that not all kinds of legal norms 
can be said to have threats of sanctions attached to them.
144
Norms conferring power to enabling 
the performances of contracts, wills and marriages are some of them. I do not wish to go much 
further into this argument. Even if it succeeds, the best it can do is to establish that some norms we 
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usually consider to be legal cannot be so considered.
145
In fact, if it is true that legal norms 
necessarily possess normative force, then if threats of sanctions are the source of that normative 
force, norms that lack threat of sanctions cannot be considered legal norms. This conclusion seems 
unsatisfactory, none the least because it conflicts with our common understanding of power-
conferring norms. However, perhaps there is a way out. Perhaps, the normative force of law is not 
conferred by threats of sanctions after all. A Razian inspired argument may help with this conclusion.
Raz and his followers, as I have said at length, argue that law necessarily claims legitimate authority. 
They do not however believe that law necessarily possesses legitimate authority. In fact Raz believes
that law can never possess the legitimate authority it claims over its subjects.
146
But let us, for sake 
of argument, assume that Raz and his followers are wrong. If, as non-positivists believe, norms to be 
legally valid necessarily possess legitimate authority conferred by their moral rightness, this 
legitimacy would be the normative force I have been looking for. Subjects would believe that the 
reason to take the norms enacted by the officials as guide to their conduct is because those norms 
originate from a source of legitimate authority. It would then be the role of the philosopher to clarify 
when legal officials can have the legitimate authority they claim and, therefore, to illustrate when 
the subjects’ belief in legitimate authority is true. So, if moral correctness can ground the normative 
force of law, what would then be of the role of threat of sanctions? At best it would have a 
reinforcing role which would attach to the primary force given by legitimate authority.
147
  
This conclusion however rests on two strong assumptions. The first is that legal norms are capable of 
possessing the legitimate authority they claim. The second is that legitimate authority is only 
possible when the alleged authority complies with sound principles of morality. These assumption 
need to be verified. But how can I accomplish this? I have to investigate the possibility of an 
individual acting on the will of another because he believes the other will has legitimate authority 
over him. I also have to investigate whether this submission is only possible when the norms of the 
authority comply with sound principles of morality. So I must also investigate what sound principles 
of morality are and how they are capable of transferring normative force to norms enacted by the 
officials. This requires a departure from the convention I have adopted until now to assume that 
sound principles of morality incorporate the principles of human rights we are familiar with. I will 
therefore venture into moral philosophy to answer some questions about legal philosophy. In sum, 
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the question I must ask is whether and how it is possible for an individual (i.e. the subject) to 
justifiably submit to the will of another (i.e. the official) in order to guide his actions. I will call this 
the other wills question. The argument from normativity will try to answer it.
4. THE ARGUMENT FROM NORMATIVITY
4.1. A Conception of Autonomy 
I start with a proposition which is primarily associated with Kant and, at first sight, seems to deny the 
possibility of answering the other wills question in the positive. This proposition says that human 
beings, as endowed beings with rationality, are capable of determining their actions according to 
principles they impose on themselves.
148
This proposition almost leads us to the familiar Kantian
concept of autonomy. There are many strong metaphysical commitments attached to this 
proposition which, if I followed Kant, I would be anchored to. I do not think it necessary or correct to 
proceed on a metaphysical line. A more pragmatic one would do.
It is a common truism that the feature that perhaps most distinguishes human beings from other 
living creatures is their ability to curtail being driven by natural impulses. This common truism does 
not deny that natural impulses like hunger, libido, fear and others are capable of directing us to act 
in a way or the other. A world where, given the possibility, we never eat when feeling hungry or 
where we would never look for shelter when feeling cold, seems almost inconceivable. However, the 
truism merely says that human beings, unlike animals, are capable of acting in ways contrary to 
those impulses for reasons not dictated by those impulses. Consider a man who goes on hunger 
strike. His natural impulse is to eat, yet he refuses to do so. Can this be explained simply by pointing 
out to another impulse like a masochistic pleasure? No doubt this further impulse might be present. 
However, we would then have to explain why he is acting on one impulse rather than the other. But 
even if we could give a plausible explanation in terms of further impulses, we would be missing the 
purpose of his actions. He is calculating that his omission to eat will impact on the way other people
perceive him and will influence how others act. It is this process of calculation which motivates him 
to deny acting on his natural impulse of hunger.
If the truism is in fact sound it means that human beings possess a faculty which is capable of 
mediating natural impulses. The faculty is our will and the process of calculation described above is 
reasoning. So, unlike other animals, we are capable of reasoning and, through our will, we are 
capable of acting on reasons. But how does our will work? Kant suggested that we must suppose 
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that we have a free will, meaning that our will is completely autonomous from all sensorial impulses. 
Our will belongs to a super-sensorial world, the noumenal world, from where it derives eternal and 
immutable laws which presents themselves to the will through reason.
149
Thus human beings, as 
long as they are endowed with reason, are capable of acting under the idea of the autonomy of the 
will.
Nowadays, not many philosophers can accept this metaphysical view. Firstly, it seems to be at odds 
with the modern scientific world view which dominates the common way we think about reality. The 
only worlds that can exist are those we can see through microscopes or observatories. The modern 
scientific world view might be wrong; but building a modern philosophical account of practical 
reasoning without it warrants more efforts than are here necessary.
150
Secondly, some philosophers 
think that the idea that we could act only by the presupposition of a free will is fallacious. Beyleveld 
and Brownsword offer the following argument:
“We may grant that a being with a will must regard its actions as under the control of its will. But to 
suppose that it does not possess free will (by supposing its will to be determined by causes external 
to it) is not to contradict the idea that it is a being with a will unless it is supposed (and what Kant is
trying to show is that it must be supposed) that a being with a will not merely exercises causality 
through its will but that in so operating it operates as a ‘first cause’. However, a will would not cease 
to be an efficient cause of action just because it itself had an efficient cause; it would merely cease 
to be a self-sufficient efficient cause.”
151
The above suggests that the idea of a free will is not necessary for action. What is necessary is 
instead the idea of regarding our actions as under the control of our will. This implies that our will 
needs not be totally independent from our natural impulses but it needs to be a separate entity
from them. This, however, does not yet settle the question of how our will works.
Christine Korsgaard suggests a powerful idea. She says that the human mind (which I take to be a 
synonymous with the human will) is self-conscious in the sense that it is capable of reflecting on its 
own activities. This sets it the problem of the normative force of certain activities. She says that 
“our capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental activities is also a capacity to distance 
ourselves from them, and to call them into question. […] The reflective mind cannot settle for 
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perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a reason. Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, it 
cannot commit itself or go forward.”
152
  
For Korsgaard, reasons are nothing else than the product of a successful reflection of the will. Unlike 
Kant, she does not think that the will has to act totally independently of our natural impulses. 
Instead, it needs to mediate our impulses and discover whether or not they provide enough reasons 
to act. Hence, the man who decides to go on a hunger strike has to calculate whether the natural 
impulse of eating possesses enough normative force to make him abandon his commitment to 
protest through that medium. So reasons are the result of a process of calculation of the will.  
But one might ask where reasons come from. We know they cannot come exclusively from natural 
impulses because they mediate them. Also, I have already excluded that they derive from the laws of 
a noumenal world. A viable option is that they derive from the basic laws of the phenomenal world, 
which are cause and effect (or induction and deduction in the context of reasoning), power but also, 
and importantly, teleology. Let me explain. Reasoning involves calculation of consequences. Our will 
investigates the consequences of the actions required by our impulses through experience or 
imagination. “If I refrain from doing X then Y rather than Z will happen”.  Yet knowledge of the 
consequences of doing X does not seem enough to motivate me to act in a way or another. It will 
only do so if I have a positive attitude towards the consequences of doing X. That is if I value the 
consequences of X and I want to bring them about. 
This is where power and teleology come into place. Let’s leave aside teleology for a moment. Even if 
I were able to accurately calculate the consequences of doing X and valued its consequences, I 
would be unable to bring about those consequences through my actions if my actions did not have 
the power to bring about those consequences. Observe the following. “I value seeing the town 
beyond the mountains. Hence I ought to move the mountains”. Formally speaking, this form of 
reasoning is correct. It calculates the consequences of certain actions and determines, because it 
values the consequences, to undertake certain actions. However, it does not calculate the power 
available. As an individual human being, am I capable of moving mountains? Clearly not. So the form 
of reasoning above will need to be adjusted in the following way. “I value seeing the town beyond 
the mountains. Hence I ought to move the mountains. However, because I do not have the power to 
move the mountains, I will walk around them until I get to see the town”.
What about teleology? Valuing X appears to be what makes me act to bring it about. But where do 
values come from and why do I value Y rather than Z? The New Natural Law school has advanced a 
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suggestion which I think satisfactorily explains the concept of values.
153
Reworking the classic 
conception of human well-being, they have proposed that human action, when rationality is 
involved, is motivated to act because attracted by certain basic goods which are essential to human 
fulfilment. But what are the basic goods and how do we discover them?
“The most direct way to uncover the basic goods is by considering actions and asking, ‘why are you 
doing that?’ and ‘Why should we do that?’ and so on. Persisting with such questions eventually 
uncovers a small number of basic purposes of diverse kinds. These purposes arouse interest because 
their intelligible aspects are instantiations of the diverse basic goods.”
154
The corresponding list of basic goods resulting from this continuous process of questioning is not 
always consistent in Finnis’ work, and for reasons I will expose shortly need not interest us too 
much. In Natural Law and Natural Rights he proposes the following: (1) Life, corresponding to the 
drive for self-preservation; (2) Knowledge, considered as desirable for its sake and not merely 
instrumentally; (3) Play, that is performance of an activity for no other sake than the activity itself; 
(4) Aesthetic experience; (5) Sociability or friendship; (6) Practical reasonableness, referring to the 
ability to bring one’s own judgement to bear on the variety of choices to make in life; (7) Religion, 
viewed as the quest for the relationship between human activity and ultimate purposes.
155
In later works, written with Grisez and Boyle, Finnis appears to have modified this list of basic goods. 
The authors suggest that they are divisible in two groups which are substantive and reflexive. In the 
first category we have life, knowledge and aesthetic experience and some degree of excellence in 
work and play. In the latter group the existing goods are expressed as a search for harmony between 
different categories. So we have harmony between individuals and groups of persons (friendship); 
harmony within an individual and his personal life (inner peace); harmony between one’s action and 
one’s judgements (peace of conscience); harmony between oneself and more-than-human source of 
meaning and value (religion).
156
This latter list appears to be more sophisticated and necessarily more complex, if not more elusive, 
than the list originally given by Finnis. But does this matter? For present purposes, not very much. 
The formulation of basic goods attempts to give an explanation of the phenomenal law of teleology. 
Teleology describes the fact that human beings purposely pursue things which they recognise as 
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valuable according to certain categories which are reflected in the list of basic goods. These goods 
are linked together with the idea of specifically human well-being (or fulfilment, accomplishment) 
which is the ultimate end (purpose, objective) of human action. So if we have to learn anything at all 
from the New Natural Law theorists, it is that reasons intrinsically depend on values, values on 
human well-being, human well-being on the categories of the basic goods. Obviously, a complete 
theory of practical reason will have to ascertain and defend a coherent list of basic goods. However, I 
am here interested in the general category and especially in their relationship with reasons. I may 
therefore be excused from defending a particular list of basic goods.
To sum up my discussion until now, I have articulated a conception of human autonomy. Human 
beings possess a faculty which is capable of mediating the natural impulses they are subject to. This 
faculty is the will. The will is capable of mediating impulses by applying the basic laws of the 
phenomenal world. These are induction and deduction, power and teleology. So our will, through 
these laws, is capable of calculating the consequences of our actions and choosing the consequences 
it values according to a conception of human well-being. In this process it necessarily considers the 
property of our power to bring into being the consequences we value. This process is called 
reasoning and the results of the process are called reasons. Two questions remain. Firstly, are 
human beings capable of acting only through reasoning? Secondly, depending on the answer to the 
previous question, do we have to engage in the process of reasoning every time we have to act or 
are there any shortcuts? I turn to these questions in order.
Some philosophers tend to focus greatly on reason-induced actions. Indeed, some have built their 
entire legal philosophy on this particular kind of action.
157
This is not a criticism. In fact I agree this is 
to be done. Law is a human enterprise and it must rest on a defining human property.
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The truism I 
opened this section with says that acting on reasons is a defining human property, so it seems more 
than reasonable, if not mandatory, to build a theory of law on a theory of practical reason. However, 
this does not warrant over-estimating reason-induced action. It is easy to incorrectly infer from 
Korsgaard’s view that our will is essentially reflective, i.e. mediates our natural impulses, that the 
only worthy human actions are those that take place through reasoned action. Stefano Bertea goes 
as far as to call reason-induced action as action par excellence.
159
But this is unwarranted if it means 
that we should limit as much as possible non-reasoned action or if it means that non-reasoned 
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action somehow debases mankind from its inherent worth, its dignity.
160
On the contrary, if human 
dignity has to mean anything, it must mean that we are capable of acting on reasons. Sometimes it is 
better that we should not engage in the process of reasoning if we lack the sufficient qualities to 
produce good reasons which are the correct calculation of the consequences of our actions 
supported by a coherent view of human well-being (more on this later). Sometimes we are simply 
incapable of acting through reasons, e.g. when we are asleep or otherwise unconscious, when the 
emergency of the situation does not allow engagement in reasons like during a fire, a vehicle 
incident, etc. The ability to act on reasons is a defining human ability; it is neither the only human 
ability nor the only human possibility.
From the above it follows that we do not only act on reasons.
161
Even when we produce good 
reasons, we sometimes do not have sufficient willpower, not to be confused with power, to act on 
them. Consider the following scenario. I have decided to go on a diet. I know there is a persuasive 
reason as I am abundantly over-weight and, if I do not go on a strict diet and avoid unhealthy foods, I 
might incur severe illnesses. On any reasonable conception of human well-being, the value of human 
health is included in the list of basic goods. So I know that there is a good reason to go on a diet and 
avoid unhealthy foods. Does this mean that I will never eat unhealthy foods until I am in good 
shape? It should, but I might not be able to always act on a good reason. I will only be able to do so if 
my will is capable of mediating the natural impulse of eating a delicious but unhealthy dish. But 
sometimes, when there is not enough willpower, the will might not be able to accomplish this task 
and it might not be able to lead me to act according to a good reason. I know what I should do but, 
notwithstanding, I am unable to do otherwise.
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This phenomenon is so common in human 
experience that it hardly needs philosophical explanation.
I have said that human beings, while endowed with the ability to reason, do not always act on 
reasons. However, they are capable of doing so. Does this mean that humans always have to engage 
in active reasoning every time they intentionally want to act? Yes and no. If acting intentionally 
means engaging the will to mediate impulses, then it necessarily means being engaged in a process 
of reasoning. However, one can also adopt reasons which have been pre-constituted more generally 
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and apply them to the scenario at hand. One of these pre-constituted and general reasons I call 
principles. 
Imagine the following. I decide I have a good reason to go to church every Sunday. I value a possible 
relationship between myself and a more than human personality. To pursue that value I calculate 
that I have to go to church to deepen my knowledge of this super-human personality and discover 
what such relationship consists of. I also know that church runs on Sunday mornings. So I have a 
good reason to go to church on Sundays. Does this mean that every Sunday morning I have to 
reconfirm whether my reason to go to church is sound? Yes and no. No, because as long as I value a 
relationship with a super-human personality and I know that the way to develop that relationship is 
by going to church, I have already concluded my reasoning process and produced a reason which 
lasts temporally until the factors that induced it are dismantled. Thus, the reason needs not be 
renewed every single time. However, yes, because new factors might arise which might impede me 
from acting on a reason which I hold good. Imagine that on a Friday night I fall down the steps and 
break several of my bones. My doctor tells me to stay in bed for a whole month. In this new 
scenario, does my reason to go to church every Sunday morning still hold good? Certainly it does. 
Breaking my bones has not altered my value of a relationship with a super-human personality; it has 
only reduced my power to act on that value. So principles are nothing else than recurring good 
reasons which we might, given the circumstances, be unable to act on. Humans develop, over the 
course of their lives, a series of principles; the aggregation of these principles I call personality. 
Certain principles can be shed when the factors that induced them are no longer held good. So 
human personality evolves with time and with reflection on whether certain actions are motivated 
by good reasons.
Principles are not the only pre-constituted and general reasons we know of. Certain reasons apply 
and are held good for certain individuals simply because of the role, social or otherwise, these 
individuals occupy. Think about a doctor. There might be good reasons for non-professionally 
qualified individuals to know their science and biology and learn surgical skills that might save other 
people’s lives. In fact these same reasons are those that are usually endorsed by individuals that 
want to become doctors. However, does a doctor, every time a patient enters into the surgical 
room, have to re-assess the factors that induced him into becoming a professionally qualified 
surgeon and calculate whether they apply to the current scenario? No. Just as with principles, the 
endorsement of certain roles carries with it certain attached reasons that are determinative of role 
in the first place. This, just as with principles, does not entail that doctors will always cure patients. 
There might be non-role considerations, such as work-induced stress, drunkenness or otherwise, 
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that might prevent the doctor from acting on the reasons that apply to his role. Yet, he knows that, 
but for these non-role considerations, there are recurring and general reasons to cure people’s life. 
These general and recurring role-based reasons I call role-personality.
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The example of the role-personality of the doctor might induce to a misunderstanding. One might 
think that the general and recurring reason for doctors to cure patients is a derivation of the primary 
reasons that led individuals to undertake that role. This is a mistake. The primary reasons can only 
explain the act of undertaking training to become a doctor. Once this act is completed, the primary 
reasons are exhausted only to re-appear, perhaps, when an individual is considering whether there 
are good reasons to abandon a role. Role-personality is constitutive of a role, independently of 
whether the role is assumed voluntarily or not. Think about the role of children. They did not choose 
to be given birth to. However, merely because of the role they occupy, there are reasons which 
specifically apply to them and them only, e.g. listen to their parents simply because they are their 
parents. Without doubts, there might be instances where this role-personality cannot be acted upon 
(e.g. the parent is abusive). These will, however, only be countervailing reasons which will have to be 
calculated in the decision of acting on a role-personality.
4.2. A Conception of Effective Agency: the Pre-Condition for the Exercise of Human Autonomy
In the last section I sketched a brief conception of autonomy. I said that human beings are capable 
of acting through reasons by calculating the consequences of their actions and endorsing those 
consequences through a conception of human well-being. In so doing they constitute their 
personality. There is however a pre-condition for the conception of autonomy I sketched. Indeed, it 
is a pre-condition for any theory that advocates the exercise of autonomy. If an individual has to be 
capable of acting on his reasons, the individual has to be within an environment that guarantees the 
exercise of autonomy. I sketch in this section the content of this environment. The resulting picture 
will result in what I call the conditions of effective agency. Without the conditions of effective 
agency, human autonomy cannot be exercised in a social context.
If an individual is to form a personality which will guide how he acts, he has to be in a certain 
condition in order to do so. Gewirth acknowledged the truth in this proposition to the extent of 
deriving all of his moral theory from it.
164
He ignored the neo-Thomistic theory of basic goods and 
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focused on the pure concept of agency.
165
He said that an agent is an individual who acts voluntarily 
and purposively. 
“By an action’s being voluntary […] I mean that its performance is under the agent’s control in that 
he unforcedly chooses to act as he does, knowing the relevant proximate circumstances of his 
action. By an action’s being purposive […] I mean that the agent acts for some end or purpose that 
constitutes his reason for acting […]”
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This view of action largely coincides with the conception of autonomy I advanced, however, with an 
important exception. The agent acts for whatever purposes he values and Gewirth does not proceed 
on the basis of the agent valuing basic goods; the agent must simply regard as good his purposes on 
his personal conception of what is good. Here follows an important step. If the agent is to act 
autonomously, he must necessarily value as good his ability to act voluntarily and purposively.
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This almost appears as a banal circular statement. Indeed, if autonomy includes acting voluntarily 
and purposively, it is obvious that the agent, when acting autonomously, must want acting 
voluntarily and purposively. Otherwise, the agent would not be acting autonomously. This apparent 
circularity can be broken by showing two things. Firstly, an agent’s valuing as good his voluntariness 
and purposiveness is different in quality from his pursuit of various actions dictated by his 
personality. Secondly, voluntariness and purposiveness are concepts which are extremely rich and 
reveal their true sense in a social context. I explore these two points in turn.
In the conception of autonomy I advanced I said that human beings, as beings endowed with a will, 
are capable of acting according to reasons and principles. The formation of reasons requires the 
ability to understand the consequences of certain actions and endorse those consequences through 
a conception of well-being derived from a list of basic goods. It is this endorsing, or valuing, of the 
consequences of actions that motivates human beings to act. The process of reasoning therefore 
includes acting voluntarily, i.e. engaging in a process of reasoning which reveals the possible 
consequences of certain actions, and purposively, i.e. forming a conception of well-being that 
enables endorsing the consequences of those actions. When Gewirth says that the agent must 
necessarily value his voluntariness and purposiveness he must mean that an agent, if he understands 
what is to be an autonomous agent, must value his voluntariness and purposiveness. This process of 
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valuing is fundamentally different from the one engaged in the process of valuing certain actions 
under a conception of well-being. Without endorsing the value of his voluntariness and 
purposiveness an agent cannot conceptually build any conception of his well-being and produce 
reasons to act on, because it is these two qualities that allow him to do just that.
The above seems unduly mysterious. The mystery can be dispersed once I show that purposiveness 
and voluntariness are non empty concepts but have substantive meaning in a social context. Take 
the example of a slave. He is a human being and he is endowed with a will. As such he has the ability 
to act on reasons and develop principles and his personality. However, his ability to translate into 
actions the reasons he develops based on his conception of well-being is severely limited by the 
power of others towards him. He might be his principle to go to church every Sunday morning to 
deepen his relationship with a super-human personality, yet he cannot. He cannot because his 
masters deprive him of the power to translate reasons that are good for him into actions. They tie 
him down every Sunday morning and force him to be immobile so that he will be able to work 
effectively for the rest of the week. His conception of well-being is judged and treated as irrelevant. 
It follows that, if the slave is to have the possibility of acting autonomously, he must, if he can, take 
steps to ensure that he can act on his own conception of well-being and that he is not deprived from 
doing so. This is what valuing his purposiveness entails: an individual must be in a position to make 
his conception of well-being have an effect on his actions if he is to act autonomously.
What about voluntariness?  Take the example of a prisoner who is used as a human subject in a 
series of experiments. Before being captured he had developed his personality and, consequently, 
had a mature conception of his well-being. However, as a prisoner, he is not in the position to decide 
whether taking part in the experiments fits with his conception of well-being. Whatever his view on 
the matter, it is irrelevant. He will be induced to take all sorts of drugs which will endanger his life. 
The irrelevance of his conception of well-being is not to be confused with the negation of his 
consent. Even if his conception of well-being had been compatible with taking some experimental 
drugs, e.g. to discover a cure that could save humanity, this view is not taken into any consideration 
by those that detain him. It follows that, if the prisoner is to have the possibility of acting 
autonomously, he must, if he can, take steps to ensure that he can engage in a process of reasoning 
about the consequences of certain actions and proceed to act on his conception of well-being. So, 
this is what valuing his voluntariness entails: an individual must be in a position to engage in a 
process of reasoning with the possibility of acting on the results of his deliberations. 
If the above is correct, it means that voluntariness and purposiveness are pre-conditions of the 
exercise of autonomy in a social context. To exercise our autonomy we must be in an environment 
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where our choices count and are capable of influencing our actions. It could be said that effective 
agency is a pre-condition of autonomy in the sense that it makes our valued prospective actions 
realisable outside of our minds (i.e. alter our external environment through action). It makes no 
sense to talk about autonomous action when these two conditions are absent simply because 
without them endorsed prospective actions, whatever they are, cannot be translated into real 
actions. The presence of the two conditions I call effective agency. If an individual is to act 
autonomously he necessarily has to value his effective agency. Effective agency should be sharply 
distinguished from perfect agency. No human possesses the latter. We can define perfect agency as
the ability to bring about whatever our will settles upon. This would require infinite power as 
commensurate with the ability of our will to imagine and endorse all sorts of actions. Obviously, as 
humans we lack infinite power. So we must focus instead on effective agency which is the condition 
under which we can bring about the consequences of our valued prospective actions that are 
commensurate with our powers. Note that it is merely an attempt that is in play. I might have the 
power to run an Olympic race with the intention of winning it. My power does not however 
guarantee that I will in fact win the race and accomplish my purpose. Possession of effective agency 
merely signifies that it is not irrational to attribute to me the possibility of bringing my endorsed 
actions into reality.
4.3. On Sound Principles of Morality: Joining Autonomy and Effective Agency 
I ventured into the conception of autonomy and effective agency in order to answer the other wills 
question. That question asks when an individual can act on the will of another because he believes 
the other will has legitimate authority over him. Non-positivists think that the question can be 
answered positively, in the legal context, when the will of officials complies with sound principles of 
morality. So I need to discover what these are and then ascertain whether the non-positivist claim is 
sound. This is what I set out to do in this section. I will argue that allowing individuals to pursue a life 
based on their personality is included in an account of what is morally required. Not all personalities 
are, however, morally permissible. Some fail to allow other individuals to pursue their own 
personalities. Moreover, some personalities are more justifiable than others because they originate 
from a conception of basic goods with integrity. It follows that sound principles of morality 
ultimately require non-interference with autonomous action which originates from a conception of 
human well-being with integrity.
It is perhaps part of collective imaginary that the demands of morality are made on us by others. 
When we think about what morality requires we imagine the familiar authorities, our parents, 
religious guides or various personifications of the moralist, admonishing us to behave in a way rather 
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than the other. If there is any truth in this common imaginary it is simply that moral claims have a 
bearing on our relationships with other individuals, including with ourselves.
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If this is correct, as I 
assume it is, it presupposes that we are capable of acting in a way or another and that, once we 
understand what morality requires from us, we can act accordingly. Moral demands therefore 
presuppose the notion of responsibility of actions. We cannot conceptually think of a beast acting 
morally if not only by metaphorical extension. A beast is the product of his nature and cannot act 
differently from what its nature impels it to do. It is unable to guide its actions otherwise. But, 
differently, humans endowed with a will can. The conception of autonomy I advanced says just that. 
Human beings, as beings endowed with a will, are capable of mediating their natural impulses and 
acting through reasons and principles they themselves develop. This is as much as we can get from 
the collective imaginary. 
Perhaps we need a reversal of perspective. This means that whatever morality requires from us does 
not emanate from external demands. Instead it emanates from where moral responsibility comes 
from, that is from the structure of our will. If this reversal is permissible, it follows that moral claims 
are those that the requirements of our own autonomy imposes on us. I have however shown that 
we cannot have a sensible talk about autonomy without taking into account the concept of effective 
agency. When the New Natural Lawyers talk about moral demands they fail in just that respect. I will 
show just that in a moment. However, we first have to understand how they get from a conception 
of practical reasoning to a conception of what we morally ought or ought not to do.
The New Natural Lawyers said that we can get to understanding what we morally ought or ought not 
to do simply by investigating how the process of autonomy works. Acting morally means acting on 
good reasons. But how does one produce good reasons for action? The principle of good reasoning 
aims to answer that question. This principle is composed of two sub-principles which are the 
principle of non-contradiction and the principle of the pursuit of basic goods.
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These two principles 
are inherent in autonomous action in the following way: avoiding self-contradiction is inherent in the 
notion that we discover the possible consequences of our prospective actions which are 
proportionate to our powers through the laws of induction and deduction; pursuit of basic goods is 
inevitable if we are to endorse the consequences of our prospective actions which best fit a 
conception of human well-being . The two sub-principles together indicate a third principle of good 
reasoning which is the prohibition of pointless action. This third principle simply says that every 
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voluntary action has to be reason-induced. However, this does not tell us very much about what we 
must or must not do and certainly does not fit with intuitions about what is morally permissible or 
not. For example, killing a baby because it is crying too loud seems not to fail the prohibition of 
pointlessness. The New Natural Lawyers acknowledge this:
“Even morally bad actions have their point. One chooses to do what is morally wrong for some 
reason, and like any other deliberate action, the reason for which one acts immorally must 
ultimately be reduced to the basic goods. So far forth, even an immoral act responds to [the 
prohibition of pointless action].”
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So how do we get to understanding what we ought or ought not to do? In the following way:
“However, morally wrong acts do not respond to this principle as perfectly as morally good acts do. 
To see why, one must consider the relationship between the principles of practical knowledge and 
those of morality. 
In prohibiting pointlessness, the first principle of practical reasoning as it were demands: Take as a 
premise at least one of the principles corresponding to the basic goods and follow through to the 
point at which you somehow instantiate that good through action. This demand is minimal and 
leaves one free to do anything from which one can anticipate any benefit whatsoever.
One can imagine another principle making a far stronger demand: Insofar as it is in your power, 
allow nothing but the principles corresponding to the basic goods to shape your practical thinking as 
you find, develop, and use your opportunities to pursue human fulfilment through your chosen 
actions. 
This stronger demand is, not only that one be reasonable enough in one's practical thinking to avoid 
pointlessness, but that one be entirely reasonable in such thinking. This stronger demand is 
inconsistent with many possible choices consistent with the weaker demand. The possible choices 
excluded by the stronger demand are those which are immoral, for the stronger demand is a way of 
expressing the first principle of morality. This expression of the first moral principle makes it clear 
that to be morally good is precisely to be completely reasonable. Right reason is nothing but 
unfettered reason, working throughout deliberation and receiving full attention.”
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The above long quote explains that what morality requires from us is to be completely reasonable; 
that is, in the pursuit of what we ought or ought not to do, we should correctly calculate the 






consequences of our actions and give equal concern to all the basic goods in a conception of human 
well-being with integrity. A conception of human well-being with integrity does not require that 
when we are reasoning about what to do we should only act on reasons that are inspired 
contemporaneously by all the basic goods; rather, morally permissible actions are those that do not 
go against one or more of the basic goods. Acting morally thus means that all our actions, while not 
always carried out in pursuit of all basic goods, do not involve the notion of acting against any of the 
basic goods. In other words, acting on a conception of human well-being with integrity requires that 
none of our actions be criticisable from the perspective of anyone of the basic goods.
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This view of moral demands as those that the structure of our will, hence our autonomy, makes on 
us is highly attractive. It gives a common denominator to all human beings endowed with a will 
against which we can measure our actions from a moral point of view. So when we say ‘this action is 
immoral’ we simply mean “this action is not the product of good reasoning which you, as a human 
being endowed with a will, are capable of”. This explains the common intuition that children, 
mentally deficient individuals and beings without a will cannot be regarded as moral agents. If they 
are not capable of reasoning, they cannot be capable of producing good reasons and even less of 
producing a conception of human well-being with integrity. Furthermore, this moral view explains 
the complexity of moral demands and why and how individuals can fail to act morally (i.e. 
completely reasonably). So an individual, while possessing a personality based on a mature 
conception of human well-being, might still fail to determine or predict the correct consequences of 
his actions by lack of knowledge or disregard of certain facts. Otherwise, even if he did possess 
knowledge of all the possible consequences of his actions, he might not have developed a mature 
conception of human well-being where all basic goods are treated with respect.
I believe the New Natural Law theory of morality to be essentially sound. However, for reasons I now 
advance, I believe it is incomplete. Indeed, it fails to articulate the consequences of the pre-
condition of autonomy, i.e. effective agency, on its moral theory and on what is or is not completely 
reasonable. It might be, and I will show that it is, that once the conditions of effective agency are 
taken into consideration, we emerge with a clearer picture of what we ought or ought not to do. 
I said earlier that effective agency is a necessary pre-condition for the exercise of autonomy in a 
social context where individuals make choices and act in ways which have an impact on how much 
we can act on our own principles and personality. We cannot exercise our autonomy if we do not 
possess or are deprived of voluntariness and purposiveness. So each individual endowed with a will, 
to be capable of acting autonomously, must make a claim on other individuals, not to be deprived of 
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his effective agency. The addressees of this claim are other individuals with a will because, as I have 
explained, only they can control their actions through a process of reasoning. But why should these 
other individuals care about this claim or act according to it? Simply because, just by being 
individuals endowed with a will, they themselves necessarily make this claim on others. Thus certain 
actions are categorically prohibited simply by recognising that every human being endowed with a 
will, including the agent, necessarily makes the same claim (i.e. to retain his effective agency) and 
regards that claim to be a pre-condition for his autonomy. 
The above opens up new possibilities that the New Natural Lawyers did not consider. When one says 
‘this action is immoral’ it appears that there could be two meanings. It either translates into ‘this 
action is not the product of good reasoning which you, as an autonomous being, are capable of’ or 
‘this action does not comply with the claim to retain effective agency that every autonomous human 
being, including yourself, must make and endorse’. But there is in fact no duality. The second 
proposition is a pre-condition of the first as effective agency is a necessary pre-condition for the 
exercise of autonomy in a social context. So claims about what we morally ought or ought not to do 
already presuppose that an individual possesses effective agency and, thus, is capable of good 
reasoning. It follows that actions that interfere with the effective agency of individuals cannot a 
priori be considered as reasonable. Actions that do not interfere with effective agency but are not 
supported by a conception of human well-being with integrity cannot be held as morally permissible. 
Let me develop this idea a little further and give another argument why autonomous beings are 
rationally required not to interfere with the effective agency of each other. The argument proceeds 
on the basis of certain basic epistemic assumptions. It says that certain things are true of the world 
independently of our believes and actions. Such truths might be basic scientific ones like the fact 
that the earth is not a flat disc or that water is H2O. Other truths might be aesthetic ones as the 
inestimable value of the Mona Lisa or of various musical outputs of JS Bach. One of these truths is 
that autonomy is a defining condition of humanity. Indeed, I have been proceeding on this basic 
assumption throughout. If this fact is indeed true of the world it necessarily imposes a condition on 
the exercise of human autonomy and impacts on what we can call a good reason for action. Let me 
explain why.
I said that a good reason for action follows from endorsement of the consequences of prospective 
acts through a conception of well-being with integrity. From this follows the simple fact that one 
must be capable of understanding the consequences of one’s actions. This, as I said earlier, entails, 
among other things,  a calculation under the laws of induction and deduction of the following type: If 
I do x then y will happen; if I do z then y will not happen. This entails that in order to ascertain the 
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consequences of our actions and to consequently produce good reasons for action through a 
conception of well-being with integrity we must take account of and act accordingly to certain truths
about the world (e.g. by doing x then y will happen). Now, I have assumed that human autonomy as 
a defining condition of humanity is one of these truths. It follows that, irrespective of our 
convictions about certain human beings (e.g. blacks or Jews), it is true that they are capable of 
reasoning (and are therefore autonomous) simply given the fact that they belong to the human 
race.
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Given this truth, failure to act consistently with it results in failure to correctly apply the laws 
of induction and deduction. Therefore no reason for action produced by acting inconsistently with 
this truth can produce a good reason for action. This none withstanding that one might have 
developed a mature conception of human well-being with integrity. But how can one fail to act 
consistently with the truth that human beings are autonomous beings? I suggest that this failure can 
take place through the idea of a performative contradiction. I have said that effective agency is a 
pre-condition of autonomy in the sense that it makes the exercise of autonomy possible in a social 
context. An action that interferes with effective agency therefore denies the existence of the 
exercise of autonomy and, consequently, contradicts the truth of human autonomy. Acting 
consistently with the effective agency of others is therefore rationally required.
Let me add an aesthetical remark to the above argument. The argument might in fact appear a little 
mechanical and formalistic in its attempt to ground the rational imperative of acting consistently 
with human autonomy in certain empirical truths. This formalism should be excused. The aim of the 
argument is to give a rational basis to the more familiar, and less formalistic, principle of respect for 
others and things. It is commonplace to ear that we should respect fellow human beings, animals 
and the environment. If we are to ground such respect in something substantive we have to identify 
the characteristics that humans, animals or nature have which demand our respect. The relevant
characteristic in humans, I argue, is their possession of a will and therefore their ability to act 
autonomously.
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But “respect” cannot mean anything substantive if it does not mean “to act in 
recognition and consistently with” a given thing. So respect for humans, I argue, simply means acting 
in recognition and consistently with the truth that human autonomy is a defining condition of 
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is  also a defining condition of black and Jews, simply given the fact that they belong to the human race.
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It is beyond the scope of this thesis to identify the characteristics which non-humans (i.e. animals, 
environment etc.) possess that demand respect from humans. I believe that once these characteristics have 
been identified in non-humans we can ascertain the scope of our moral obligations towards non-humans. 
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humanity. Translating this respect for human autonomy in a social context requires prohibition of 
interference with effective agency.
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If all the above is correct it means that the New Natural Lawyers wanted to explain more than they 
could with their theory of practical reasoning. They had to take into consideration the element of 
effective agency and articulate the rational requirement of respect for human autonomy. It also 
implies that Gewirth, and with him the neo-Kantian tradition, has to articulate a theory of practical 
reasoning which defends in full the idea that humans act in pursuit of human well-being by 
attempting to instantiate through action the basic goods. What I have attempted here is the 
unification of two moral philosophical traditions: the neo-Thomistic or Aristotelian tradition with the 
neo-Kantian one. They have been separately subject to severe criticisms.
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However, a theory that 
attempts to unify both, as I have done, shows that they are not only compatible but that they are 
necessarily complementary.
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4.4. The Normative Force of Law: First Steps towards Answering the Other Wills Question
In the previous section I illustrated that morally permissible actions are those that are in accordance 
with the effective agency of individuals and are built on a conception of human well-being with 
integrity through the exercise of autonomy. What is morally prohibited is therefore interference 
with humans’ effective agency and actions not supported by a conception of well-being with 
integrity. My venture into moral theory was motivated by the non-positivist belief that norms, to 
possess normative force, cannot sanction what is morally prohibited. Now that we have a clearer 
picture of what is morally prohibited we can investigate with greater precision that claim and answer 
the other wills question.
The other wills question asks how and why should a group of subjects act on the norms enacted by a 
group of officials. I advance the following answer which I will defend in greater detail. A group of 
subjects can act on the norms of the officials, and justifiably do so, when the norms are the product 
of the necessary mediation of the personalities of those subjects with the purpose of maintaining a 
community of autonomous individuals. The pre-condition of maintaining the community of 
autonomous individuals is the recognition and protection of their effective agency. It follows that it 
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Remember that effective agency does not coincide with any specific action. Rather effective agency, as the 
unification of voluntariness and purposiveness, enables specific action. Therefore respect for autonomy does 
not require non-interference with specific actions. Indeed, interference with specific actions (e.g. theft or 
homicide) might indeed flow from a good reason for action.
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Bernard Williams separately criticises, perhaps unfairly, each tradition in B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy (Harvard University Press 1985), chapters 3 and 4. 
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See par 5.1 below for a more detailed discussion of why the neo-Thomist and neo-Kantian tradition have to 
be amalgamated. 
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is by recognising and protecting the effective agency of their subjects and mediating their 
personalities that officials provide norms possessing normative force for their subjects. This all 
sounds too mysterious and complicated. However, it is by unravelling this complexity that we 
discover that the separation thesis is extremely misleading: legally valid norms can be immoral, but 
only in certain ways. Norms that emanate from officials who do not recognise that their addressees 
are autonomous beings who necessarily make a claim to retain their effective agency cannot be 
legally valid. They cannot be legally valid simply because these norms cannot have the necessary 
normative force for subjects. I proceed to expand on the elements of this answer to the other wills 
question.
In the argument of community I said that norms, to be legally valid, necessarily need to possess 
normative force for their subjects, otherwise we fall into the paradox of effectiveness that Hart’s 
theory of legal validity suffered from. The argument also established that Fuller was right and that 
officials and subjects are engaged in a common enterprise, that of subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of norms, which necessitates a requirement of reciprocity. But, one should ask, what 
does this requirement of reciprocity consist in? It consists in the following: both officials and subjects 
are members of a community of autonomous individuals. This should not sound mysterious at all. In 
fact legal systems are made of human beings. We already know that human beings, differently from 
other animals, possess a will through which they are capable of guiding their actions. To do so they 
develop reasons and principles and consolidate their personalities. But, one might ask, if legal 
systems are made of autonomous beings, then why should a group of those beings, i.e. the subjects, 
curtail their autonomy and act according to what another group of human beings, i.e. the officials, 
tell them to do through norms? While advancing the other wills question I proposed two possibilities 
for this question. One was the threat of sanctions and the other was authority. I casted doubts on 
the previous and said that authority would be workable if it can be shown to be legitimate. 
Wolff argued that the authority of the state (which for present purposes we can assume to coincide 
with the authority of the officials
178
) can never be held legitimate because it conflicts with the moral 
duty of individuals to be autonomous. In his words:
“The moral condition demands that we acknowledge responsibility and achieve autonomy wherever 
and whenever possible. Sometimes this involves moral deliberation and reflection, at other times, 
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The authority of the state and the authority of legal officials do not always coincide. We can say that the 
latter category is always included in the former but not always the other way round. Positivists, as I have 
shown, argue that the relevant legal officials are law-applying institutions (courts, tribunals, etc.). Necessarily 
law-applying institutions are a part of the state’s machinery; however, they are not always the only political 
institutions. Think for example of law-making institutions like parliament or law-enforcing institutions like the 
police.
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the gathering of special, even technical, information […] The defining mark of the state is authority, 
the right to rule. The primary obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled. It would seem, 
then, that there can be no resolution of the conflict between the authority of the individual and the 
putative authority of the state. Insofar as a man fulfils his obligation to make himself the author of 
his decisions, he will resist the state’s claim to have authority over him.”
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It is important to stress that Wolff does not think that this insoluble conflict between authority and 
autonomy means that an individual should never do as he is told; instead he should never do as he is 
told only because he has been told to do so. He should only do as he is told when, by deliberation, 
he concludes that it is the right thing to do. If Wolff is right then, on reflection, the norms enacted by 
the officials cannot possess normative force given by authority, simply because authority can never 
be legitimate as it is immoral. But Wolff is wrong, and fundamentally so. Morality does not demand 
of us to exercise our autonomy; it is the exercise of autonomy that makes morality possible. Moral 
claims demand that we exercise our autonomy in a correct way. Let me explain.
In my discussion of what morality consists in, I said that we could not have any conception of 
morality without the idea of the responsibility of our actions. Human beings can determine the way 
they act because they are in possession of a will through which they can mediate their natural 
impulses and act on reasons. I also said that human beings can act autonomously but do not always 
do so; certain human beings, children and the mentally incompetent for example, are not endowed 
with working or well developed wills. So we cannot attribute any moral responsibility to them. It is 
the presence of a will and our autonomy that makes morality possible. Does it follow that we are 
under a moral obligation to always exercise our autonomy? The question does not make much 
sense. If it is answered in the positive it has some drastic effects. We would have a moral obligation 
not to sleep and to engage in sophisticated reasoning under periods of emergency. Even children 
and the mentally incompetent could be said to be under the moral obligation of exercising their 
autonomy to the extent they are capable of it. Again, this does not make much sense. Morality is not 
about exercising autonomy; rather it is about how our autonomy is to be exercised. I said that 
morally prohibited actions are those that are not completely reasonable, those that involve a 
miscalculation of the consequences of our actions or that are not supported by a conception of 
human well-being with integrity. If authority can help us to engage in the correct calculation of what 
are good reasons for actions, then it cannot be immoral. Morality does not care whether we reach 
the good reasons independently from other people, it cares that we reach the good reasons. So 
Wolff is wrong when he says that our moral duty is to be autonomous individuals. 
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My conclusion is not far from Raz’s who tells us, through the service conception, when an authority 
can be held to be legitimate. He asks: “how can it be consistent with one’s standing as a person to be 
subject to the will of another in the way one is when subject to the authority of another?” He 
replies:
“The suggestion of the service conception is that the moral question is answered when two 
conditions are met, and regarding matters with respect to which they are met: First, that the subject 
would better conform to reasons that apply to him anyway (that is, to reasons other than the 
directives of the authority) if he intends to be guided by the authority's directives than if he does not 
(I will refer to it as the normal justification thesis or condition). Second, that the matters regarding 
which the first condition is met are such that with respect to them it is better to conform to reason 
than to decide for oneself, unaided by authority (I will refer to it as the independence condition).”
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So these two conditions tell us that an authority is legitimate only when we reach better reasons 
overall by complying with authoritative utterances rather than engaging in the reasoning process 
ourselves (the normal justification thesis). This is consistent with what I said earlier. Morality 
demands that we reach the correct decision, so if complying with authoritative utterances can help 
us do that, the authority will be morally legitimate.
From the above it appears that the legitimate authority of norms enacted by the officials is a real 
possibility. However, the service conception cannot provide a satisfactory legitimisation test 
necessary for legal norms. This is so because, under the service conception, the officials would 
almost never be able to emanate norms possessing normative force for their subjects. Consider the 
following. The service conception says, among other things, that authoritative norms enacted by the 
officials are justified when they provide subjects with morally good reasons for action. I have said 
that morally good reasons for actions are those that follow from calculating the consequences of our 
actions and choosing those consequences that follow from a conception of human well-being with 
integrity (i.e. a conception of well-being which cannot be criticised from the perspective of any of 
the basic goods) . If authoritative utterances are thus to be justified then authorities must know, 
better than their subjects, what the possible consequences of the actions of their subjects are and 
what conception of human well-being with integrity supports those actions. But authorities can 
hardly know this better than their subjects, because the goodness of reasons depends on the 
situation of those that are engaged in a process of reasoning. A reminder of a reasoning process will 
suffice to prove the point.
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Remember the example of an individual who decides to go to church every Sunday to deepen his 
relationship with a super-human personality. He produces a recurring and general reason to this 
effect which I called a principle. However, principles are only good generally not particularly. In fact, 
having broken his leg and having been advised to stay in bed for a month, he re-engages in a process 
of reasoning and decides that he cannot act on his principle of going to church every Sunday because 
the circumstances that produced it have change, i.e. he does not have the power of going to church 
as he is bed-ridden. So, ultimately, good reasons for actions are circumstances-dependent. If this is 
true, norms enacted by officials cannot produce good reasons for action for their subjects unless 
they can predict and accommodate all the relevant circumstances of their subjects. But this is hardly 
plausible. It appears even more implausible when we consider that the officials have to be capable 
of predicting and accommodating all the possible circumstances of all their subjects and enact norms 
that can accommodate all of them at the same time. This would require divine predictive and norm-
drafting abilities. The best officials could do is to produce norms that work well as principles. But, as I 
have said, good principles do not produce good reasons without accommodation to the 
circumstances.
So the service conception cannot explain the normative force of the norms enacted by the officials. 
Actually, endorsement of it will lead us to the idea that norms enacted by the officials will only rarely 
be justifiable because incapable of providing good reasons. But could we not just say that norms 
enacted by the officials will be legitimate, hence legally valid, if they are capable of providing good 
principles for their subjects? This appears as a workable solution. There would obviously be a 
compromise. The officials’ norms will not always be completely reasonable, i.e. they would not 
always comply with what morally ought to be done, as they would not necessarily match the 
circumstances of their subjects. However, they would provide their subjects with general reasons, 
i.e. principles, to guide their conduct. But, even if officials’ norms could be considered as principles 
for their subjects, we would still have to understand what justifies them. Obviously, the service 
conception would no longer be workable as it is concerned with reasons and not principles. So we 
need to know what could justify the practice of taking norms enacted by officials as principles. I will 
suggest that it is the idea of maintaining a community of autonomous individuals who necessarily 
make a claim to retain their effective agency that justifies this practice.
4.5. The Normative Force of Law: Making Autonomy Possible in a Community
Social interaction instantiates a basic good. It is something the pursuit of which needs no rational 
justification. This needs not arouse any scepticism. It is part of experience that certain kinds of social 
relationships are intrinsically worthy and that an individual that does not participate in these kinds of 
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relationships misses out on a fundamental aspect of his well-being. Take friendship as an example. 
We do not seek friends merely because they can provide us with certain tangible benefits such as 
assistance in time of need, or comfort in time of tribulations. We seek friends because our 
interaction with each other makes us better and more fulfilled individuals. The tangible benefits we 
receive from our friends are dependent on this intrinsic value. Friendship also requires something 
we are all well familiar with in order to develop; it requires reciprocity of actions and attitudes. Each 
individual must treat the well-being of his friend as if it was his own and take actions to ensure that 
his friend acts according to good reason. So friends offer each other advice about what ought to be 
done and engage in a process of reasoning together. It is because of the intrinsic value of the 
relationship that friends often act on the reasons offered by each other and, even when they fail to 
act accordingly, none the less hold dear the reasons offered. So the normative force of the norms 
offered by friends as advice lies in the intrinsic value of friendship. All this is familiar to common 
experience and sensible.
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Can the model of friendship extend to more complex social interactions like that between officials 
and subjects and hence become the foundation of the normative force of norms enacted by 
officials? There are serious doubts about this. Let’s call the relationship between officials and 
subjects a political one and expand on the ways in which friendship is different from a political 
relationship. Firstly, unlike friendship, it is much more difficult to prove that a political relationship is 
intrinsically valuable. Secondly there seems not to be the same requirement of reciprocity that exists 
in friendship in a political relationship. Finally, a political relationship proceeds on the basis of 
authority rather than advice. If we are to ground the normative force of the norms enacted by the 
officials in something like that existing in friendship, we have to overcome these difficulties. I think 
this can be done and proceed accordingly.
182
The intrinsic value of friendship was not hard to state as it is part of general experience. Yet, it seems 
that we cannot borrow from this common experience to prove that a political relationship is in itself 
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For an analysis of practical reasoning in friendship and friendship as an intrinsic good see Finnis, n 16, 141-
144. Let me, for sake of completeness, indulge in the analysis of intrinsic and instrumental value. Something is 
instrumentally valuable if it is valuable as a means to something else. Something is intrinsically valuable if it is 
valuable as an end, i.e. not simply valuable because it helps to achieve other things. In a way all things, 
including friendship, are instrumentally valuable. They help us achieve human well-being which we pursue 
through the categories of basic goods. But basic goods are no mere platonic ideas. They are instantiated in the 
activities we engage in. Engaging in certain enterprises (e.g. friendship) reveals itself as a realisation of a basic 
good and thus leads to human well-being. This is the reason why I say later, in the text accompanying n 195,
that even playing chess has moral implications.
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Some of the discussion below is inspired by the idea of associative political obligations as defended by R. 
Dworkin, n 4, 195-216 and J. Horton, ‘In Defence of Associative Political Obligations: Part Two’ [2007] Political 
Studies 1. See also S. Perry, ‘Associative Obligations and the Obligation to Obey the Law’ in S. Hershovitz (ed), n 
140, 183-312.
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valuable and conducive to human well-being. Certainly, we could say that some forms of political 
relationships actually lack any intrinsic value. We can think about the political relationship present in 
Nazi Germany or any more recent political societies where those in political power ignore the basic 
rights of their subjects. But this kind of reasoning is deficient. After all, the value of some forms of 
friendships is highly disputable. Who would want his child to befriend a drug dealer or a member of 
a gang? We are not interested in whether some realisations of friendship or political relationship are 
intrinsically valuable. Rather, we are interested in the question whether a general idea of political 
relationship is intrinsically valuable. If it is, then we can judge various examples of political 
relationships and evaluate whether they possess this intrinsic value. I propose that the intrinsic value 
of such a relationship lies in its enabling property to provide that each member of a society pursue 
his own life according to his own personality in a way that is conducive to co-habitation with other 
autonomous individuals. This appears at first as an instrumental value but reveals its intrinsic value 
through its importance in the development of human well-being.
The development of human well-being is only possible in society. This might appear as a 
controversial claim but, at closer analysis, is indeed a truism. We are not born outside of society in a 
science fiction type world absent of interaction with other human beings. All the objects of human 
fulfilment are placed or are susceptible to interaction with other individuals. Think about friendship. 
If it is true that it is intrinsically valuable, its realisation requires the presence of other human beings. 
Or think about the fulfilment of the goal to get acquainted with the ultimate end of existence. 
Religious practices have a fundamental social aspect. It is not merely that certain religious practices 
require worship in community; rather, their social aspect is that we engage in the process of 
investigation of ultimate ends through the various forms that are presented to us in society either by 
embracing them or by rejecting them. So the truism reveals that social interaction has an enabling 
property. It enables us to pursue, through forms that are presented to us in society, the instantiation 
of the various abstract forms of the basic good. Our reasons, principles and personalities therefore 
develop as a response to the particular social interactions we encounter.
However, it should not be thought that social interaction has only this positive aspect of enabling 
our autonomy. It has a powerful negative one. The fact that we live in society implies that our 
actions necessarily interfere with that of others and the actions of others interfere with ours. Simply 
said, our autonomy has to take consideration of others. This is not necessarily only a moral issue 
about how we ought or ought not to treat each other. It is also a matter of power. We simply cannot 
bring about the consequences of certain actions we value simply because the presence of other 
individuals prevents its realisation. Think about the pursuit of creating a physical space where 
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reflection and meditation is made possible through permanent silence. In our attempt to create this 
space, we would necessarily have to consider the existence of other individuals and investigate how 
to overcome the possibility of them discovering it and disrupting the meditative space. So the 
presence of other individuals always changes the calculation of power and, necessarily, limits the 
scope of our autonomy. We are simply not free to make certain choices. 
There is another way society might have a negative impact on our autonomy. Other individuals 
might, through their actions, interfere with our effective agency and thus prevent us from exercising 
at all our autonomy. This negative impact is different from that I described in the previous 
paragraph. In my discussion of autonomy, I described the impossibility of perfect agency. Our agency 
is made even more imperfect because of the necessary interferences with the calculation of power 
that the presence of other individuals entails. However, the presence of other individuals also gives 
rise to the possibility that their actions will interfere with our effective agency which is a pre-
condition of the exercise of autonomy. 
So there is a challenge. We cannot but be in society to exercise our autonomy; however, our 
presence in society both limits the scope of our autonomy and can threaten its exercise. So we need 
a way out. We need a way that is both compatible with autonomy in society and ensures its 
existence. That way, I suggest, is through a particular idea of political relationship based on authority 
in a community of autonomous individuals. The exercise of such authority is conducive to the 
creation of a community where each member is equal in the possession of the opportunity to 
develop his own reasons, principles and personality on which he acts. Such development is however 
limited by the fact that other members of the community are involved at the same time in the same 
task of developing their personality. An authority is therefore needed to limit the ways each member 
can undertake that development in a manner that is conducive to the maintenance of the 
community. The officials must therefore undertake two interwoven roles. Firstly, ensure that there 
are common standards that do not allow the interference with the effective agency of the members 
of the community. Secondly, set standards for the development of personalities which can be said to 
be common.
This ideal of political relationship is nothing else than the communitarian view of law advanced by 
Fuller with a particular reference to human autonomy. That communitarian conception sees officials 
and subjects engaged in a common enterprise, that of subjecting human conduct to the governance 
of norms, with a requirement of reciprocity. The requirement in this ideal of political relationship is 
that both officials and subjects acknowledge that the group is formed of autonomous individuals and 
that each is entitled to a society where autonomy can be exercised. The requirement of reciprocity is 
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substantive. As a minimum it requires that the effective agency of each member is secured. It must 
be secured both from interference from actions of subjects and both from interference from actions 
of officials. Indeed, there could not be a community of autonomous individuals without the 
existence of its pre-condition which is effective agency.
So, just as in the case with friendship, the political relationship in the communitarian view is 
intrinsically valuable in making autonomy possible in society. Furthermore, just as in friendship, 
there is a requirement of reciprocity which is the recognition of the autonomy of each member of 
the community and a mutual need of non interference with effective agency. One might then ask 
why this community of autonomous individuals necessitates a political relationship based on
authority rather than threat of sanctions, or as in the case of friendship, mutual advice. 
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To 
respond let us remind ourselves of how authority works. 
In Razian terms, authority requires that individuals refrain from engaging in a process of reasoning 
and defer to the authoritative statement to guide their conduct. Authoritative norms directly 
exclude the exercise of autonomy and offer reasons for action which are calculated by the authority 
rather than the addressees. Therefore, if it is the exercise of autonomy that makes morally wrongful 
acts possible in a society, including acts that interfere with the effective agency of others, it is the 
autonomy-excluding nature of authority that is capable of blocking that process. Advice and 
sanctions do not aim to block the exercise of autonomy. They only aim to alter the reasoning process 
either by showing how the reasoning process ought to be conducted to reach good reasons, in the 
case of advice, or, in the case of threat of sanctions, by creating further specifications of the 
consequences of possible courses of actions (e.g. if you disobey the law this evil will be inflicted on 
you). Authority is therefore the most effective means to ensure that members of a society do not 
engage in a process of reasoning which will lead them to act in ways which violate the maintenance 
of a community of autonomous individuals. 
At closer inspection the communitarian view of law is therefore similar to that of friendship. Its 
intrinsic value is in promoting a community of autonomous individuals. Its requirement of reciprocity 
is the recognition that each member of the community is an autonomous individual and requires 
protection of his effective agency. The political relationship in the communitarian view also requires 
authority as it is the most effective way to ensure that the members of the community do not 
produce reasons which induce them to act in a way contrary to the maintenance of the community. 
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This is in fact a powerful critique made by L. Green, The Authority of the State (OUP 1988), 200 where he 
says: “To concede that the conditions of human development require society is not to concede that they 
require authority, unless we repeat Hume’s error of holding that the former is impossible without general 
recognition of the latter”.
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Therefore, just as with friendship, the normative force of the norms enacted by the officials is to be 
found in the intrinsic value of the maintenance of a community of autonomous individuals. 
So the other wills question appears to have its answer. A group of subjects can act on the norms of 
the officials, and justifiably do so, when the norms are the product of the necessary mediation of the 
personalities of those subjects with the purpose of maintaining a community of autonomous 
individuals. The pre-condition of maintaining the community of autonomous individuals is the
protection of their effective agency. It follows that it is by recognising the autonomy and protecting 
the effective agency of their subjects that officials provide norms possessing normative force for 
their subjects. 
The answer I have given to the other wills question has serious implications for the separation thesis 
and helps to explicate the various suppositions I adopted when discussing Fuller and the 
requirement of legal normativity. I disentangle the remaining issues in the next sections.
4.6. The Limits of the Moral Fallibility of Law 
We can only speak of legally valid norms in a community where officials and subjects are engaged in 
the common enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of norms with a 
requirement of reciprocity based on the recognition of the autonomy of each member. I have 
already shown that Hart falls into a paradox when he talks about legally valid norms that are 
addressed to no one and which no one has reasons to take as guide to their conduct. Speaking about 
legally valid norms only makes sense when those to which the norms are addressed have reasons to 
engage with them, i.e. possess normative force. Legal officials claim the authority to tell their 
subjects how to behave through norms. They therefore must assume that they are addressing 
individuals who can engage with those norms and alter their balance of reasoning by engaging with 
the same norms. Therefore legal officials, when making a claim to authority, impliedly acknowledge 
that their addressees are autonomous individuals. In fact, it is precisely the fact that subjects are 
autonomous individuals that requires that the officials make a claim to authority. I have shown 
under what conditions that claim can be regarded as legitimate and, therefore, when subjects have 
good reasons to engage with the officials’ norms. It is under those conditions that we can sensibly 
speak of legally valid norms. 
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Norms enacted by officials that do not recognise that their addressees are autonomous individuals 
cannot be legally valid because they cannot possess any normative force for their addressees. This is, 
on reflection, uncontroversial. Imagine a society where human beings started legislating for a group 
of dolphins or horses expecting them to behave how the norms prescribe. We would clearly not 
need to engage in philosophical disputes about whether those norms are legally valid or not. They 
are simply senseless. But imagine a situation which appears only a little less paradoxical. Imagine a 
society where those in political power enact norms that prescribed that their subjects, human 
subjects, be taken one after the other, irrespective of consent, to the slaughterhouse and be killed 
until their total annihilation. Hart thought that this could be described as a legal system and that the 
norms of this society could be regarded as legally valid.
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But this is senseless. The officials cannot 
be regarded as officials of the subjects simply because the subjects are not regarded as autonomous 
beings with the ability to govern their lives, accept or deny claims to authority, or regulate their 
actions through norms. There are no obligations, duties or practical reasoning. Claims of legitimate 
authority are senseless. There is only brute force. Hartian positivism survived through an 
equivocation. Only those that are called to create and enforce these norms are regarded as 
autonomous beings. We could then speak about a legal system and legally valid norms within this 
restricted group of norm-makers and norm- enforcers. However, just as in the case of the legal 
system of dolphins and horses, it would be senseless to speak of a legal system and legally valid 
norms when we take into consideration the individuals that are destined to the slaughter-house.  
Does Razian positivism fare any better? Raz says that officials necessarily claim legitimate authority 
over their subjects while they may fail to have it. The claim to authority helps to identify who are the 
relevant officials in a legal system and, by analysing the sources of the norms enacted by these 
officials, we discover the sources of law in a legal system. Only the norms emanating from these 
sources can then be held to be legally valid. Raz’s analysis proceeds in the following direction: from 
the claim of authority to the sources of law. Yet he fails to consider the opposite direction of enquiry 
and to consider whether it squares with his results. If necessarily legal officials make a claim to 
authority we must consider who they make that claim on. Perhaps dolphins and horses? Clearly not 
as dolphins and horses cannot engage in reasoning so cannot understand claims to authority. We 
need not investigate any further this rhetorical question. Claims of authority can only be made on 
autonomous individuals, beings capable of engaging in a process of reasoning. So if legal officials 
necessarily make a claim to legitimate authority they must necessarily acknowledge that those they 
are addressing with their claims are autonomous individuals. But we know that acknowledging that 
                                                          
184
See text accompanying n 139.
84
others are autonomous individuals carries with it a moral duty of non interference with their 
effective agency. Indeed, as I have shown, we cannot have a sensible talk about autonomy without 
the pre-condition of effective agency. So if legal officials necessarily make a claim to authority on 
autonomous subjects they also necessarily have to recognise the effective agency of those subjects 
and assume a moral duty of non-interference with it. It follows that, if the law necessarily claims 
legitimate authority, it also necessarily claims that it does not interfere with the effective agency of 
its addressees. 
However, I have said that understanding law through a claim of legitimate authority alone is not 
enough. The law cannot merely claim authority. To be capable of claiming legitimate authority, it 
must have de facto authority, i.e. its addressees must believe that the law possesses the legitimate 
authority it claims. So the central philosophical task is describing under what conditions subjects can 
reasonably hold this belief. I have described under what conditions subjects can regard law as 
possessing legitimate authority. I rejected Raz’s service conception and advanced the communitarian 
view of law. This communitarian view says that authority is legitimate when it is used to maintain a 
community of autonomous individuals. Maintenance of the community requires norms that prohibit 
interference with the effective agency of their members. So, there cannot be legitimate authority 
when officials enact norms that interfere with the effective agency of their subjects.
In the end, when we understand that legal validity cannot be explained by claims alone, Razian 
positivism fails. Law is not whatever sources say it is. Norms cannot be legally valid when they 
interfere with the effective agency of the members of a legal community.  Razian positivism fails to 
appreciate that in order to talk about law we have to talk about community. Law is not simply the 
projection of the state of mind of a group of people (the officials). It is a common enterprise 
between a community of autonomous individuals who are all interested in pursuing a plan of life and 
developing their own personalities. 
So let me recall Gardner’s definition of the separation thesis which positivists defend. “In any legal 
system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the law of that 
system, depends on its sources, not its merits (where its merits, in the relevant sense, include the 
merits of its sources).”
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The thesis is false in two respects. Firstly, it ignores that a legal system is 
not composed of only officials. A legal system is a community composed of various autonomous 
individuals with various roles. Legal validity cannot sensibly be restricted to a section of that 




community alone. Such restriction leads to the paradox of effectiveness. Secondly, Gardner’s thesis 
seems to exclude the fact that norms of a given system necessarily need to possess normative force 
for their subject. This much, as I have argued, is entailed by the thesis that law claims legitimate 
authority which Gardner himself is committed to.
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It follows that identifying legally valid norms in a community requires engagement in a moral 
question. The question is the following: does a norm emanate from a group of officials who 
recognise their subjects as autonomous beings? The question requires a positive response if the 
norm is to be counted as valid in a community. 
4.7. On the relationship between Legal Normativity and Normative Force
The discussion on the normative force of law sheds important lights on the discussion in part 1 on 
the requirement of legal normativity or, as I will refer for sake of clarity in this section, on the 
requirements of the rule of law. I said that the principle of the rule of law requires that a legal 
system be capable of guiding the conduct of its subjects through norms. I also argued that the moral 
quality which underpins this principle is a particular conception of equality that requires that legal 
norms establish equal demands from their subjects and assume that they are all equally capable of 
performing their requirements. My discussion on the normative force of law gives substantive 
weight to those theses. I therefore flesh out in this section the relationship between the two 
concepts.
Why must a legal system, through its officials, be capable of guiding the conduct of its subjects 
through norms? Simply because norms, in particular authoritative norms, can only be addressed to 
autonomous beings who are the members of a community. Officials that are incapable of 
communicating with, and are incapable of guiding the conduct of, autonomous beings cannot enact 
legally valid norms. I have explained the rationale for this conclusion in the argument from 
community and, in particular, by exposing the paradox of effectiveness. So the principles of the rule 
of law exposed by Fuller tell us how legal officials can accomplish that conduct-guiding task 
adequately through prospective norms, non contradictory norms, etc. But Fuller did not fully 
articulate a conception of the identity of the subjects of a legal system. Acknowledging that they are 
autonomous beings in fact opens up a new series of requirements that I have discussed in 
considering the normative force of law, in particular the requirements of effective agency. 




Understanding that the subjects of a legal system are autonomous beings also helps us to 
understand the moral property that is essential to the rule of law which I identified to be that of 
equality. Nigel Simmonds, who defends the non-positivism of Fuller, has instead proposed that that 
moral property is that of liberty. He says: 
“[...] the value served by the rule of law is the value of liberty. […] In claiming that the rule of law is 
intrinsically linked to liberty, we rely upon the same concept of liberty that is invoked in treating 
slavery as intrinsically violative of liberty. […]When a citizen lives under the rule of law, it is 
conceivable that the duties imposed upon him or her will be very extensive and onerous, and the 
interstices between these duties may leave very few options available. Yet, if the rule of law is a 
reality, the duties will have limits and the limits will not be dependent upon the will of any other 
person. […]To be governed by law is to enjoy a degree of independence from the will of others.”
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It is important to note that for Simmonds the liberty essential to the rule of law is not an 
unrestricted one. Instead, it relates only to those areas where officials have not enacted norms and 
therefore allow their subjects optional conduct. Simmonds then develops the idea that protecting 
the areas of optional conduct for subjects is the essential moral characteristic of law. He says:
“To make its governance effective, and to retain a substantive monopoly over the use of force, a 
regime must prohibit potentially coercive interferences, and it will thereby create a protective 
perimeter for the said domains of optional conduct. To the extent that the law leaves me with
such options, it renders the existence of those options secure and independent of the will of others. 
Similarly, to the extent that the law grants me certain protections against interference (a 'protective 
perimeter' of claim rights, for example) the existence of those protections is secure and independent 
of the will of others.”
188
This theory of the moral property of the rule of law as freedom is compatible with that of equality I 
advanced. Indeed, once I have identified that Simmonds’ moral property of equality coincides with 
the recognition that the subjects of a legal system are all equally autonomous beings, Simmonds’ 
theory must presuppose mine. In fact I have said that legal validity in a community rests on the 
acknowledgement by the officials that the subjects are autonomous and are capable of pursuing a 
plan of life based on their respective personalities. It is this recognition that necessitates the 
enactment of norms that restrict interference with the effective agency of the subjects and which 
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requires the officials to mediate the reasons that apply to the subjects with the view of maintaining 
the community. This already commits one to acknowledge that the members of the community are 
all equal in one substantive respect: they are all autonomous beings. 
As I have argued, it is exactly the property of autonomy that requires and ultimately justifies the use 
of authority. Authority attempts to exclude subjects from acting on reasons they develop themselves 
in order to ensure that they act instead on common standards in view of maintaining a community. 
Authority therefore appears as antithetical to freedom of action. However, and this is the crux of 
Simmonds’ argument, the use of authority ensures that in areas where common standards have not 
been set, each member of the community is free to pursue his own actions based on his own 
personality. Indeed, it is the existence of norms which guarantee the effective agency of the subjects 
that allows them to pursue their plans of lives in the absence of common norms. In fact, as I have 
repeated at length, effective agency is the pre-condition for the exercise of autonomy. It follows that 
Simmonds’ identification of liberty as the moral property of the rule of law is better read as a 
corollary to the moral property of equality I proposed. In fact, without the recognition that all the 
subjects are equally autonomous beings and its substantive implications, the liberty Simmonds 
advocates cannot be made possible.
The relationship between the normative force of law and the normativity of law (or rule of law) is 
therefore almost indistinguishable. The earlier lays the foundation for the latter. Understanding the 
intrinsic relationship between the two concepts also explains why, contra Raz, the rule of law 
conceptually does coincide with “equality (before the law or otherwise), human rights of [some] kind 
or respect for persons or for the dignity of man”.
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The rule of law is not a formal or merely 
instrumental concept exactly because the normative force of law rests on a particular conception of 
equality and rests on the respect for the dignity of man, understood as the ability to act 
autonomously. The rule of law is a morally loaded concept. So, ultimately, positivism fails also in this 
respect.       
5. THE ARGUMENT FROM THE SUBJECTS’ POINT OF VIEW
In the argument from normativity I established that legal validity of norms depends on satisfaction 
with a moral requirement: recognition of the autonomy of the members of a community. I therefore 
showed that, by endorsing the separation thesis as presented by Gardner, positivists commit a 
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fundamental mistake. In this section I want to take a critical stance towards non-positivism as 
expressed by Finnis and by Beyleveld and Brownsword. 
When I answered the other wills question I showed that the normative force of law is not 
determined by its compliance with sound principles of morality. Indeed, by explicitly rejecting Raz’s 
service conception as the basis for the normative force of law, I endorsed the view that legally valid 
norms can, all things considered, fail to satisfy what morality requires from us. Morality, as I argued, 
demands that we act on reasons that follow from a conception of human well-being with integrity. 
Acting in a way which interferes with the effective agency of others is a priori immoral. The 
argument from normativity established that satisfaction with a specific moral requirement, i.e. 
recognition of the autonomy of the members of a community, is a condition of legal validity. This is 
the way law cannot fail what morality requires. However, it can fail morally in other ways. I illustrate 
two senses in which norms can fail what morality requires and still be held legally valid. 
The first says that the officials can fail to tell their subjects what they morally ought to do. Indeed, 
because law makers are not omniscient, at best they can produce good principles and not 
necessarily good reasons. The second way law can fail morally is by excluding certain members of a 
political system from the legal community. The resulting picture is that in the same political system 
we can have a group of individuals for whom it is sensible to talk about legally valid norms, whereas 
it is senseless to talk about legal validity for others. These two ways law can fail morality are given by 
considering the effect legal norms have on their subjects. Indeed, if the normative force of law is 
established by considering the relationship between officials and subjects, the relationship between 
legal and moral validity has to be understood in the context of this relationship.
5.1. How Law Can Fail Morally: Not Telling Subjects what they Morally Ought to Do
It might be recalled that Finnis’ non-positivism is primarily methodological. According to him, a legal 
theorist can only give an adequate description of law when he understands its impact on the 
practical reasoning of those that are practically reasonable. The theorist must therefore decide who 
the practically reasonable person really is. It turns out that this person is the moral person: an 
individual who acts on reasons that follow from a conception of human well-being with integrity. It 
follows that the central case of law is determined by what a moral person can decide to do. In Finnis’ 
words:
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“If there is a point of view in which legal obligation is treated as presumptively a moral obligation 
[…], then such a viewpoint will constitute the central case of the legal viewpoint. For only in such a 
viewpoint is it a matter of overriding importance that law as distinct from other forms of social order 
should come into being, and thus become an object of the theorist’s description.”
190
Finnis’ methodology is not satisfactory in two respects. He can be accused of cherry-picking the 
point of view that most suits a non-positivist theory without giving an adequate explanation for this 
choice.
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But more importantly, Finnis is to be criticised as he too quickly concedes to positivism 
that norms can be legally valid, albeit in a non central case sense, when they do not comply with 
what morality requires. But this, as I have argued, cannot be the case. To speak about law we have 
to speak about a community of autonomous individuals. From the recognition of the autonomy of 
the members follows the need for authoritative norms in order to ensure the continuing existence of 
the community. But from the recognition of autonomy follows also substantive limitations of what 
norms can be legally valid. These are indeed moral limitations. It is therefore inconsistent with the 
communitarian view of law, which I have given evidence that Finnis himself is committed to,
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that 
Finnis can accept legally validity of norms, albeit in a non-central case sense, when they prescribe 
interference with the effective agency of the members of a community. 
From the above it follows that we ought not to speak of the central case of law as coinciding with 
the point of view of the moral person or indeed of the practically reasonable person. Rather, we can 
only sensibly speak of the law in a community of people capable of practical reasoning. The 
difference is subtle but from its elucidation follows very important points. Non-positivism cannot 
succeed if it arbitrarily picks the description of the social phenomena of law in a moral point of view. 
Indeed, such methodological move drastically weakens the necessary connection that legal validity 
has with morality, and in particular, with the exercise of autonomy. Once we understand that it is 
already in the nature of law that it cannot act immorally in an important way (i.e. interfere with 
effective agency therefore making talk of autonomy senseless), we can no longer embrace Finnis’ 
methodological commitment as it transforms that necessary moral limitation into a contingent one 
based on what point of view we adopt. 
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If non-positivism is no longer linked to determining legal validity from an arbitrary methodological 
point of view, we immediately understand that legal and moral obligation do not necessarily 
coincide. Rather, a special kind of moral obligation, i.e. recognition of autonomy, is a pre-condition 
for the notion of legal obligation. We already know that recognition of autonomy is only a limited, 
albeit fundamental, part of what morality requires from us. It follows that if law cannot fail this 
moral limitation it might quite understandably fail other moral requirements; and it often does so. 
Let me use the usual example of the Sunday morning church-goer to illustrate my point. 
The officials of a community recognise that all their members are autonomous beings and ensure 
that each member is capable of exercising its autonomy. They however genuinely believe that 
pursuing a relationship with an extra-human personality will be conducive to the well-being of the 
entire community. They therefore decree as a norm that all their subjects must go to church every 
Sunday morning. We know that such a norm has normative force as it flows from officials that 
recognise and make possible the exercise of autonomy in a community. But does this norm comply 
with what morality requires? Not necessarily. This decree will be all things considered reasonable 
(hence morally permitted) only if the extra-human personality the officials promote actually exists 
and is worthy of devotion. Would it be reasonable to promote the cult of flying carpets and fridges? 
Obviously not. Would it be reasonable to promote the devotion of one of the monotheistic religions 
we are acquainted with? Let us leave to one side the fact that a norm which makes mandatory the 
pursuit of religious practices entirely misses the point of those practices. Such mandatory decree 
would however only be reasonable if it mandated the devotion of a deistic personality that existed 
and wanted to be pursued. We doubt that such personalities exist and some philosophers have 
insisted that gods are the creation of man.
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If gods are truly the creation of man then devotion of 
gods is unreasonable and morality would require us not to spend our time in such illusory practice. A 
mandatory decree in this respect would therefore be immoral. But would it cease to be legal?
If we adopted Finnis’ methodology we would say it was a legally valid norm, albeit not in the focal 
sense. But we know that we do not have to adopt Finnis’ methodology as it deprives us of the 
necessary relationship between law and human autonomy. So we would say it is a valid legal norm 
albeit, all things considered, not morally permissible or irrational. But this conclusion, which follows 
from all that I have said, seems to be at odds not only with Finnis’ theory but also with that of 
Beyleveld and Brownsword. After all, did they not say that “A law is a rule which it is Morally 
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legitimate to posit for attempted enforcement”.
194
I accept that my view creates an irresolvable 
tension with the non-positivism of these authors. It is inevitable because the ethical vision at the 
heart of these theories of law is different. Once this difference is shown, it will be possible to 
understand, and indeed it will be necessary to defend, the idea that legal officials can fail through 
legal norms to tell their subjects what they morally ought to do.
Let us recall the ethical foundation of Beyleveld and Brownsword’s non-positivism. I illustrated that 
they owe much to Gewirth’s ethical theory which proclaims that we can determine the content of 
what morality requires from us from the simple analysis of voluntariness and purposiveness which 
are at the foundation of agency. I myself relied on this analysis to obtain substantive requirements 
which make talk of autonomy sensible. However, I refused to acknowledge that the entire scope of 
morality can be limited to the principles inherent in effective agency. I said that morality is the way 
we ought to exercise our autonomy. It is the structure of our will, in particular the acknowledgement 
that all autonomous human beings are engaged in the same enterprise, that imposes limits on what 
count as good reasons for action. We are all engaged in the pursuit of our well-being through 
participation in the basic goods. Good reasons for action are thus those that follow from a 
conception of our well-being which gives equal respect to the basic goods, i.e. a conception of well-
being with integrity. As I have said, this does not mean that a good reason for action is one that is 
motivated by all the basic goods contemporaneously. Simply, a good reason is one which can be said 
not to contravene any of the basic goods.
This ethical system therefore necessarily builds on Gewirth’s insights but does not coincide with it. 
Indeed, on further analysis, this ethical system might lead us to the assertion that every practical 
choice we make is a moral choice. In fact, as long as we are autonomous beings and engage in 
voluntary action, all our actions flow from our conception of well-being. So whether we are deciding 
what moves to make in a chess match or whether we are considering assassinating our neighbour, 
we are engaging in a practical choice which can be observed through moral lenses. But this appears 
paradoxical. It is part of common understanding that morality has to do with important choices and 
that there is no sense in talking about the morality of playing chess. Indeed Beyleveld and 
Brownsword build on this common understanding and assert that 
“Reasons for action can, of course, be given which are not specifically moral. When a chess player 
makes a specific move in a game and his reason is to force checkmate, to consolidate his pieces, to 
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defend against a winning attack, etc., then this is not a moral reason. [...] In each case the reason is 
an instrumental reason, a reason which states that the action performed is a means to a specific 
end.”
195
But this does not square with what I have said. One has to ask why a certain individual is engaged in 
playing chess in the first place. The positing of this question reveals that engagement in certain 
activities is a way to construct our well-being, is a way to instantiate in material and observable 
circumstances the abstract concepts of basic goods. If this is so, it follows that every exercise of 
autonomy, including decisions to engage in trivial activities, can be judged by how well they 
instantiate the basic goods they are pursuing. It also follows that every process of reasoning can be 
judged from a moral perspective. So we can sensibly ask the following moral questions about a chess 
game. Will moving the queen in that direction and hence forfeiting the match give you a worthwhile 
experience of the basic good of play? Would your experience not be better realised by moving the 
pawn instead and creating the occasion for a checkmate? If the second move will create a more 
worthwhile experience, why are you not making it? Perhaps, because you do not realise that you can 
make it? Or perhaps for sake of friendship (another basic good), you wish to forfeit the game and 
enhance the confidence of your adversary? Trivial choices and activities have moral implications as 
do important ones. We cannot escape this fact as long as the decision to engage in actions is 
motivated by a conception of well-being. Trivial and important actions mainly differ in the extent in 
which they contribute to human well-being. The theory of autonomy I have advanced tells us just 
that. 
The above conclusion might be looked at by some with sceptical eyes. Some might argue that I 
misunderstand the whole scope of what morality requires. This criticism has two parts. Firstly, it says 
that morality regulates actions that have an impact on the well-being of others. It seems that the 
ethical theory I have defended applies even when the actions of an individual have no implications 
whatsoever for other individuals. Indeed, from the notion that we are engaged in moral action 
whenever we act voluntarily it follows that voluntary actions which cannot possibly impact on other 
individuals have moral repercussions. The second part of this criticism builds on the first. It says that 
once it is established that morality regulates inter-personal activity, any substantive requirements of 
moral action must be expressed in terms of duties. I have been ambiguous about such terminology. 
Sometimes I refer to moral obligation (which is commonly used as synonymous for duty), other 
times I refer to what morality requires from us. Usually I refer to good reasons for action. If both 
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criticisms are merged together they say that morality has to do with duties individuals owe 
categorically to each other.
196
The source of these criticisms can be perhaps traced back to the Kantian tradition. In the 
Groundwork Kant expressed the supreme principle of morality in the following terms: “Act in such a 
way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always at the same 
time as an end and never merely as a means”.
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Gewirth thought he could give more substantive 
content to this abstract formulation and, by analysing the concept of agency, articulated the 
supreme principle of morality in the following way: “Act in accord with the generic rights of your 
recipients as well as yourself”.
198
If the Kantian tradition is right,
199
and morality has to do with 
duties individuals categorically owe to each other, then I must be wrong in asserting that every 
voluntary action, even one that does not have repercussions on other individuals, is in effect a moral 
action.  But I do not think I am wrong. Let me explain why.
The moral question has its foundations in human autonomy. We know that it is senseless to 
attribute moral responsibility to non autonomous beings. It is senseless because they cannot act 
otherwise as their natural impulses direct them to. It is because autonomous human beings possess 
a will and are capable of reasoning that human beings have the problem of how they ought to act. 
This practical ought, however, is not restricted only to concerns towards other autonomous beings. 
Indeed, it is concerned with all possible courses of actions, which obviously include, but are not 
restricted to, courses of action that will affect other individuals. So if the moral question has its 
foundations in human autonomy, its scope must also be that of the exercise of autonomy. Since we 
can sensibly ask how we ought to act in every course of action that is within our powers, it follows 
that the entire scope of the exercise of autonomy is subject to the moral question. The Kantian 
tradition, within which Beyleveld and Brownsword fall given their connection to Gewirth, has 
confined the moral question to a limited scope, the interpersonal one. The moral permissibility of 
non-interpersonal actions is then judged on the basis of the permissibility of interpersonal ones.
200
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But this cannot do. While it is important to ask what we categorically owe each other, this question 
does not resolve the more global moral question of what we ought to do in this or that situation. So 
the Kantian tradition has to go back to Socrates’ question which asked ‘how should one live?’
201
I 
have defended the idea that one should live on the basis of reasons which flow from a conception of 
human well-being with integrity.
The above induces me to make a further distinction which will appease the criticism about moral 
terminology. I said that morality governs any purposeful action, including those that are trivial. Yet, it 
seems paradoxical to talk about a moral duty to play chess well. I admit the possibility of this 
paradox. However, the source of the paradox lies in the instinctive concept of morality as confined 
only to interpersonal relationships. Once this notion of morality is abandoned, as I have advocated it 
should, we can discover and endorse a distinction which Fuller advanced in his moral philosophy but 
which has been largely neglected. Fuller opened his Morality of law by advocating two views of 
morality. He said that morality has to be understood as comprising a morality of duty and a morality 
of aspiration. The second has to do with “the morality of the Good Life, of excellence, of the fullest 
realisation of human powers.”
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The first “lays down the basic rules without which an ordered 
society is impossible […] it does not condemn men for failing to embrace opportunities for the fullest 
realisation of their powers. Instead, it condemns them for failing to respect the basic requirements 
of social living.”
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Let me explain how this distinction fits within and resolves the terminological 
issues concerning duty of an ethical theory based on autonomy.
I have said that morality requires from us to live a life based on reasons which flow from a 
conception of human well-being with integrity. Disrespect in our actions for any of the basic goods 
cannot be morally justified. This is therefore the scope of the morality of duty. Unlike what Fuller 
might seem to suggest by speaking of the morality of duty as setting down “basic rules without 
which an ordered society is impossible”, I do not think that the morality of duty ought to be confined 
only to inter-personal relationships. I have already explained above why this is so. Yet, if we think 
about the fact that basic goods are diverse, incommensurable and can be realised in our actions in 
degrees of excellence, one immediately understands that morality cannot be confined only to what 
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ought or ought not to do, hence mere duties, but it expands into the dimension of which purposes 
one ought to pursue and how one ought to realise these purposes. 
This further dimension of morality cannot be expressed in mere terms of duties. One has to take into 
account the skills, inclinations and powers that nature endows on each individual in enabling him to 
lead a life in pursuit of well-being. This automatically translates into an aspirational dimension of 
morality. It also translates into a subjective dimension of morality. Each subject endowed with moral 
responsibility (i.e. autonomous human being) is capable of specifically human fulfilment in a way 
that, given his abilities, powers and inclinations, is specifically his. Yet people can fail to realise their 
potential and to live life at its fullest. We can criticise them accordingly. It would be awkward to say 
that they have failed their moral duty, in the sense of disrespect for basic goods. Rather, we can say 
that they have failed the moral aspiration to live life at its fullest and to realise their potential.
If we ultimately wanted to retain talk of morality in terms of duties we could talk about absolute and 
aspirational duties. Absolute duties coincide with the moral requirement of a conception of well-
being with integrity. Aspirational duties coincide with the subjective dimension of human fulfilment.      
The differences between the ethical system I defend and that of Beyleveld and Brownsword’s 
explain why, unlike them, I think law can fail morally. We both recognise that law cannot fail its 
absolute duty to ensure effective agency. But morality is much more than claims to effective agency. 
Moral claims are present in all voluntary human actions. Legal validity of norms cannot be based on 
the correct prediction and catering of all possible human actions. At best, legally valid norms aspire 
to tell their subjects what ought morally to be done in specific circumstances and therefore aim to 
function as good principles. They aspire, but can fail, to direct subjects to realise their aspirational 
duties. So the law can fail to act morally when legal norms do not prescribe what we morally ought 
to do. We already know that officials cannot fail to ensure the effective agency of the members of 
their community in recognition of their autonomy. This is as much as they cannot fail morally. But 
the officials can fail to regulate what ought to be done in particular occasions because every 
autonomous human activity engages complex moral calculations which are inherently subject and 
circumstances-dependent. The moral duty of the officials is to ensure the effective agency of their 
subjects. Their moral aspiration is to tell them how they ought to act in this or that scenario. 
5.2 How Law Can Fail Morally: Not Including Certain Individuals in a Legal Community
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The last section helped us to realise that legally valid norms, i.e. norms possessing normative force in 
a community of autonomous individuals, can fail to prescribe what morality requires. It seems 
therefore that the central thesis of contemporary non-positivism has to be discarded. This is only 
partially true. While law can fail morality, it can only fail in certain ways. Recognition of the 
autonomy of the members of a legal community is a moral requirement that legally valid norms 
cannot fail. It is a substantive requirement that necessitates officials to ensure non-interference with 
the effective agency of the members of a community and to set common standards of behaviour. 
This is the special way the law cannot fail morality. In this section I want to illustrate an important 
way in which law can fail morally. I will defend the notion that a legal community does not 
necessarily coincide with a political system. In the same political system there might exist a group of 
subjects for whom the norms of the officials posses normative force, hence are legally valid. 
However, in the same political system, another group of individuals might exist for whom the 
mediating role of the officials cannot be said to be performed. For this second group, given that the 
officials’ norms cannot posses normative force, one cannot say that a system of legally valid norms 
applies to them. 
The above appears, at best, as unduly mysterious. How can it be that in a political system one can 
speak of the same group of norms as being at the same time both legally valid and legally invalid? 
Does this not reveal a great confusion of thought and, in the end, a complete failure of the theory of 
legal validity I subscribe to? After all, disagreements about the separation thesis are always 
expressed in terms of legal validity or invalidity of norms. No one has advanced an absurd-sounding 
theory of relative legal validity. This is conceded: a theory that reveals that legal validity is a relative 
concept departs from conventional discourse in jurisprudence. However, as I will show, it is not 
incorrect. 
Let me use an historical political system to prove my point. The Nazi regime has been used by 
positivists as conclusive proof of the separation of legal and moral validity. In part 1 I said that this 
cannot do. It cannot do because positivists do not offer an analysis of the ways in which the Nazi 
regime used the machinery of the law to fulfil its wicked purposes. Furthermore, if it is true that the 
law can fail morally in some ways, then it appears that generally pointing out to the Nazi regime 
cannot be used as proof of anything. One has to pin-point the ways norms enacted by the Nazi 
regime failed morality. I will very briefly illustrate the fact that the wicked purposes of the Nazi 
regime were not compatible with the machinery of the law. This substantiates once more the 
conclusion reached in part 1 of this thesis. However, whether or not the law was a suitable 
instrument for the Nazi regime, it is uncontroversial that the norms enacted by the Nazi officials 
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could not possess normative force for a series of individuals that were under the political control of 
the regime. The regime targeted the effective agency of Jews, Roma, non-Jewish Poles, Jehovah 
Witnesses, political dissidents, mentally and physically disabled individuals and others. Speaking of 
legally valid Nazi norms for this group of individuals is as senseless as speaking of legally valid norms 
addressed to a herd destined to the slaughter-house. 
Consider the following measures enacted by the Nazi regime. The Law for the Restoration of the 
Professional Civil Service
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was aimed at purifying the civil service from non-Aryans and political 
opponents of the regime through a compulsory retirement scheme. Along similar lines, the Law 
Against the Overcrowding of German Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning
205
limited non-
Aryan participation in education. Other Nazi enactments excluded Jews from cultural and 
entertainment enterprises,
206
inheritance of agricultural lands
207
and from editorial work in the 
press.
208
The two infamous Nuremberg Laws respectively deprived Jews of full German citizenship 
and prohibited marital and extra-marital intercourse between Germans and Jews.
209
Without doubts 
these Nazi measures contravened any reasonable conception of equality. Now consider art 109 of 
the Weimar Constitution which was in force at the time of these Nazi measures. In clear terms it 
said: “All Germans are equal in front of the law.”
210
One then wonders how these discriminatory 
measures were made constitutionally permissible. The answer lies in the Enabling Act 1933. I set out 
the relevant sections.
“The Reichstag [the National Parliament] has enacted the following law, which is hereby proclaimed 
with the assent of the Reichsrat [the Parliament representing the German states], it having been 
established that the requirements for a constitutional amendment have been fulfilled.
Article 1: In addition to the procedure prescribed by the constitution, laws of the Reich may also be 
enacted by the government of the Reich. [...] 
Article 2: Laws enacted by the government of the Reich may deviate from the constitution as long as 
they do not affect the institutions of the Reichstag and the Reichsrat. The rights of the President 
remain undisturbed.






The Reich Culture Ministry Law, 29 September 1933.
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The Reich Entailed Farm Law, 29 September 1933.
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The Reich Constitution of August 11th 1919 (Weimar Constitution).
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Article 3: Laws enacted by the Reich government shall be issued by the Chancellor and announced in 
the Reich Gazette. [...]”
It was thanks to this Act, in particular art 2, that the Nazi regime was authorised to enact measures 
which were unconstitutional because discriminatory. Thanks to the analysis undertaken in part 1 of 
this thesis, we know that the Enabling Act was a measure which violated the requirement of legal 
normativity. In fact, it is clear that the Act possessed negative dependent normative value which led 
to an explicit derogation from constitutional rights.
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This Act, which had no normative value of its 
own, permitted the ostracism of the individuals persecuted by the regime by not making available to 
them their legal right to non discrimination. If this is true, the persecutory Nazi measures were not 
compatible with legal normativity and therefore were systemically invalid. As for the concentration 
camps and the horrors of the holocaust, we know that these were not legally authorised and formed 
part of a series of extra-legal measures under the direction of the SS.
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All this shows, once again, 
that respect for the rule of law is not compatible with substantive injustice.
The brief but significant analysis undertaken above was necessary in order to prevent a criticism 
which my thesis about the moral fallibility of law might make me vulnerable to. I have subscribed to, 
and I am in the process of refining, the thesis that law is morally fallible in certain ways. This thesis 
should not be interpreted to mean that legal normativity (or the rule of law) is compatible with 
substantive injustice. I have spent the entirety of part 1 defending that incompatibility. The moral 
fallibility thesis which I am now defending relates to the relationship between a legal community and 
a political system. The individuals the Nazi persecuted, through the use of systemically legally invalid 
norms and through extra-legal means, were members of the Nazi political system. However, they 
were not members of the legal community existing in Nazi Germany. In fact, once the Nazi officials 
had started their campaign of persecution and extermination, their norms could not have normative 
force for these minorities. These minorities, to make it clear, were not part of the Fullerian legal 
community where officials and subjects are engaged in a common enterprise with a requirement of 
reciprocity. Why were these minorities not part of the legal community? Simply because, by aiming 
to their complete annihilation, the Nazi officials did not recognise and protect the exercise of their 
autonomy. The SS, under authorisation by the Nazi elite, enslaved and exterminated these 
minorities and therefore interfered with their effective agency. Because recognition of autonomy, 
with its pre-condition of effective agency, is the basis of the normative force of law it is senseless to 
speak about legally valid norms in relation to these minorities.
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While the Nazi political system did not recognise the autonomy of the persecuted minorities, it 
certainly recognised the autonomy of the majority and ensured their effective agency. Indeed, the 
Nazi propaganda against the ethnic minorities, in particular against the Jews, was built on the 
alleged dangerousness of these minorities for the survival and flourishing of the Aryan majority.
213
We know that this was nonsense. Yet, clearly, between Nazi officials and the majority of the subjects 
there was a relationship based on a Fullerian requirement of reciprocity. For the majority, in sum, 
the norms enacted by the Nazi officials had normative force. 
Appreciating that a political system and a legal community do not coincide is crucial for our 
understanding of the moral fallibility of law. A legal community might fail to incorporate in its 
membership individuals that are part of the political system in which it exists. This is a moral failure. 
As I have argued, morality requires that we recognise the autonomy of others and therefore 
demands that we should not interfere with their effective agency. The Nazi legal community failed, 
for several individuals, this moral duty. Yet, it retained its legal character because it respected that 
moral duty for others. Further reflection reveals that a legal community which fails to incorporate in 
its membership a minority will also fail to respect the rule of law. Indeed, if the moral quality of the 
rule of law lies in the equality of individuals and the equality of these individuals further lies in the 
equal possession of autonomy, non recognition of autonomy will result in failure to comply with the 
rule of law. This sounds complex but is in fact very simple. Consider what I have already said. The 
Nazi officials did not recognise the autonomy of the minorities under their political control. They 
wanted to use the law as an instrument of persecution. They could not as the German system of 
norms fulfilled its role of enabling the autonomy of each individual. Indeed the Weimar Constitution 
prohibited discrimination. The Nazi therefore had to violate the rule of law, by employing the 
ostracism strategy, in order to achieve some of their persecutory purposes.
Legal philosophers have been concerned for far too long as to whether there was law in Nazi 
Germany.
214
They have also been asking the wrong question. Without doubts, given the discussion 
above, there was law in Nazi Germany. The relevant question that ought to have been asked is the 
following: for whom were Nazi norms legally valid? The answer, as illustrated above, is that there 
was a system of legally valid norms for those subjects whose effective agency was not interfered 
with by the Nazi officials. 
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[1958] Harvard Law Review 593, IV. L. Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law — A Reply to Professor Hart’ [1958]
Harvard Law Review 630. Dworkin, n 4, 101-104. 
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The above conclusion brings me to endorse the view that the idea of legal validity is a relative or 
subjects-dependent concept. Once we understand that a political and a legal system do not coincide, 
non-positivists no longer need to be embarrassed by the deployment of the Nazi political system as a 
conclusive example of the viability of the separation thesis. They need not be embarrassed in any 
case because, as I have shown, the discriminatory Nazi measures were systemically invalid. Yet, my 
conclusion might be the source of some embarrassment as it departs from the canonical 
understanding of law as either existing or non-existing. Fuller spent some time trying to install in 
legal discourse the idea that legality can be a matter of degree. He was largely unsuccessful and, 
pushed by Dworkin, modified his account by saying that respect for the value of legality can be a 
matter of degree.
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I have endorsed this approach in my discussion of the requirement of legal 
normativity. However, any such comprise in discussing the notion of legal validity is to be resisted. 
Talk of legal validity is senseless without the establishment of the grounds of the normative force of 
law. Once we understand that the normative force of law cannot be explained through detached 
statements, empty claims or mere beliefs but is to be found in the recognition of autonomy, all 
political relationships can be judged on the basis of that criterion. It follows that the absence of that 
criterion in certain instantiations of political relationships, e.g. the relationship between Nazi officials 
and the persecuted minority, signifies that we cannot classify that political instantiation as a legal 
one.
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CONCLUSION: MAKING SENSE OF THE DISAGREEMENTS
I have defended the idea that legal validity is intrinsically linked to the idea of human autonomy. 
This is, on close inspection, not a surprising claim. Legal norms aim to guide human behaviour 
through authority. However, the idea of authority lies in the idea of autonomy. Why would we 
demand that others behave the way we prescribe if they could not behave otherwise? It is the 
specifically human ability to act autonomously that makes possible acting otherwise. Therefore the 
idea of autonomy is conceptually prior to that of authority. If law is necessarily authoritative it 
follows that it must exist in a community of autonomous individuals. Talk of autonomy makes sense 
only when individuals enjoy effective agency, when they are in the position to pursue a plan of life 
based on a conception of well-being. So effective agency and autonomy are what make the 
authoritative nature of law possible and necessary.
From the analysis of the concept of autonomy and its relationship with the authoritative nature of 
law one understands that law is morally fallible, but only in certain ways. If this is true it means that 
the separation thesis is not only false but also misleading. Only when one articulates an ethical 
theory based on human autonomy is one capable of understanding the relationship between moral 
and legal validity. Positivists like Hart fail to articulate that ethical theory and suppose that 
commitment to moral agnosticism is compatible with the quest to ascertain the relationship 
between law and morality. But how can one understand how law and morality are related if one 
does not know what morality requires? Any defence of the separation thesis that proceeds on 
ethical agnosticism is doomed to fail. It necessarily fails because it cannot understand the necessary 
relationship between morality and autonomy and between autonomy and law. 
Other positivists like Raz who have engaged in their writings on ethical problems fail to connect the 
threads. If law’s claim to authority is a moral claim that itself puts one in moral territory. However, 
the law cannot merely claim authority. It must be capable of having it if it claims it. When one 
understands that the law can have the authority it claims only when it makes autonomy possible in a 
community, the idea of legal validity reveals itself as inextricably linked to morality. 
The moral link between law and autonomy is of a specific kind. Law does not collapse into morality. 
Rather, a special moral duty is a precondition of legality. The idea of the rule of law and the idea of 
legal validity both reveal themselves as grounded in the moral duty of non-interference with 
effective agency and in the recognition of autonomy. This is the specific way the law cannot be 
morally fallible. Non-positivists do not recognise that the moral fallibility of law is limited. Because 
they aim to ground the normative force of law in morality they commit a mistake by excess. The fact 
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that the normative force of law is indeed to be grounded in morality does not mean that the law is 
not morally fallible. Morality has a wide scope. Its scope coincides with the scope of the exercise of 
autonomy. Within this wide scope lays the more limited domain of the moral duty of recognition of 
autonomy of individuals, which is specific to the law. It follows that while the law must abide within 
the moral scope of recognition of autonomy it can transgress the other requirements of morality. 
And it often does. 
The above reveals and shatters the source of the disagreements about the separation thesis. 
Ultimately, the source lies in the thesis itself. Legal validity depends on a specific moral duty and not 
more. Because the separation thesis is both false and true in different respects it is misleading. 
Therefore, it ought to be abandoned. The relevant question, if any, which positivists and non-
positivists ought to disagree about is the specific way in which legal and moral validity are 
connected. Surely, they are connected. I have advanced the way in which they are. The idea of 
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